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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit turned ten
years old in October 1992.1 The decade saw the court refine the law
of damages in patent cases to a degree never before known in patent
jurisprudence.2 The court greatly clarified the principles involved
in such areas as entitlement to lost profits, 3 handling of "established
royalties," 4 methodologies for setting reasonable royalties under
the patent damages statute,5 and the ascertainment and award of
prejudgment interest. 6 Within each of these categories, many
problems and questions of law arose and were resolved. For exam-
ple, the general topic of lost profits involved questions of recovery
for forced erosion of a patentee's prices as a result of infringement,7
questions of entitlement to lost profits on related lost sales of unpat-
1. See Emmette F. Hale III, The "Arising Under"Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An Oppor-
tunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 229 (1986) (noting that Federal
Circuit was established in October 1982 with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases, partly in attempt to bring uniformity to patent law).
2. See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 20.01-.03 (1992) (providing historical
development of patent infringement damages and modem perspectives on monetary dam-
ages); 3 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17.08 (2d ed. 1992) (presenting
overview of remedies for patent infringement, including damages and injunction); 3 ROBERT
A. WHITE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS §§ 9.01-.04 (1991) (presenting
synopsis of patent damages law); John M. Skenyon & Frank P. Porcelli, Patent Damages, 70 J.
PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 762, 763-85 (1988) (presenting overview of trends in patent
damages law with focus on lost profits and reasonable royalty).
For pre-Federal Circuit works on the topic of patent damages, see generally 8 ANTHONY W.
DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 739-806 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1987) (focusing on
early patent damages law); 8 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS
§§ 27:1-:50 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (presenting broad overview of patent damages with
focus on pre-1952 law); 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVEN-
TIONS §§ 1137-1153 (1890) (presenting early law on patent damages); Richard L. Stroup, Pat-
entee's Monetary Recovery from an Infringer, 59J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 362, 373-404
(1977) (providing overview of patent damages law shortly before advent of Federal Circuit);
Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 840-52 (1960) (summarizing
briefly scope and basis for recovery of damages in patent infringement suits).
3. See infra notes 45-125 and accompanying text (explaining Federal Circuit's changes
in law of proving lost profits damages).
4. See infra notes 126-40 and accompanying text (discussing transformation in proof of
"established royalty" under Federal Circuit).
5. See infra notes 141-208 and accompanying text (relating Federal Circuit's changes in
damages recovery based on reasonable royalty).
6. See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text (illustrating solidification of prejudg-
ment interest awards under Federal Circuit jurisprudence).
7. See infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (examining courts' provision of dam-
ages to patentees where infringers' competition forces price cuts in patentees' patented
product).
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ented goods,8 and the seemingly unsolvable damages questions
posed by the presence of competitive noninfringing products in the
marketplace. 9
The newly understood principles spawned almost as many new
questions, so that when the first decade of life under the Federal
Circuit drew to a close last fall, practitioners and judges still
strongly debated many controversial points on patent damages.' 0
These debates are not fueled entirely by scholarly curiosity. Courts
are awarding increasingly higher damages in patent cases, as illus-
trated by the Polaroid-Kodak litigation on instant photography that
was settled inJuly 1991 for $925 million only a few months after the
District of Massachusetts had set Polaroid's recovery at $873 mil-
lion. ' The Hughes Tool Co. v. Smith International Inc. 12 and Hughes
Tool Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 13 litigations on oilfield drillbits re-
sulted in judgments exceeding $100 million in the late 1980s.
14
8. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing cases that award damages
on lost profits for unpatented items where related to patented product through collateral
sale).
9. See infra notes 51-97 and accompanying text (discussing transformation in Federal
Circuit's requirement of absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes).
10. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (illustrating continuing disagreement about
whether acceptable substitutes must have been commercially sold); infra note 125 and accom-
panying text (relating ambiguity in availability of damages for collateral sales); infra notes 207-
08 and accompanying text (explaining lack of methodology for assessing reasonable royalty).
11. Kurt Eichenwald, Kodak's Payment to Polaroid Reduced, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 12, 1991, at 33.
The Polaroid case was first filed in 1976. Validity and infringement of several Polaroid patents
were determined in 1985, and an injunction against further infringement issued. Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 878, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 305, 345 (D. Mass.
1985), stay denied, 833 F.2d 930, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (Fed. Cir.), aff'd, 789 F.2d 1556,
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986). On appeal, Kodak
sought a stay of the injunction, but the stay was refused by the court of appeals. Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 833 F.2d 930, 931, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1080 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The district court's decision was then affirmed on the merits of validity and infringe-
ment. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1574, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561,
574-75 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
The case then returned to the District of Massachusetts for a trial on damages. This led to
the initial award to Polaroid of $454,205,801 in lost profits and reasonable royalty damages,
and $455,251,766 in prejudgment interest. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1541 (D. Mass. 1990). Several months later, the district judge modi-
fied his decision to correct certain errors in calculation and reduced the total award by $36
million. Eichenwald, supra, at 33. This modification resulted in a new damages award of some
$437 million and a new interest award of about $436 million. Id. The case was settled in July
1991 for $925 million, ending a 15-year battle over patent rights to instant cameras and film.
Kodak Settles with Polaroid, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 1991, at D8.
12. 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81 (C.D. Cal. 1986), vacated, 839 F.2d 663, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1686 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
13. 816 F.2d 1549, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914
(1987).
14. Hughes Tool Co. v. Smith International Inc. and Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.
were parallel cases involving alleged infringement of the same Hughes oil drillbit patent. See
Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 816 F.2d 1549, 1552-53, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396,
1399 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that Hughes sued Smith and Dresser for infringement of same pat-
ents), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987). On the strength of the initial decision of patent invalid-
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And the cookie litigation involving Procter & Gamble, Nabisco, Kee-
bler, and Frito-Lay settled in 1989 shortly before trial for $125
million. 15
The impact of large damage recoveries in patent cases has not
been lost on businesspeople around the world. In September 1992,
The New York Times reported that Japanese companies, relatively in-
active in the past as patent plaintiffs in the United States, are now
taking note of large infringement verdicts and settlements in the
United States and are planning to seek similar remuneration on
their U.S. patents.1 6 This topic plainly generates interest at the
highest corporate management levels here and abroad, both from
the points of view of enhancement of profits for plaintiff companies
and of risk management for actual and would-be defendants.
ity by the Central District of California in the case against Smith, the Northern District of
Texas summarily dismissed the case against Dresser. Id.
After the reversal of the invalidity holding by the Ninth Circuit, the case against Dresser was
reinstated and went to trial. Hughes Tool Co., 816 F.2d at 1550, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
This resulted in a total award of$132,096,430.92, which included $29,439,158.91 of prejudg-
ment interest. Id at 1555, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. Certain relatively minor aspects of
the trial court's decision were held "arbitrary" by the Federal Circuit and were set aside. Id. at
1558, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. The case was remanded for redetermination of damages
based on a reasonable royalty computed in accordance with the court's opinion, id., and there-
after was settled. See James R. Norman, Hot Potato, FORBES, July 9, 1990, at 38 (noting that
Dresser Industries reportedly paid Hughes $23 million in cash and stock of undisclosed
value).
Hughes was awarded $205 million in damages in its suit against Smith by the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California in 1986. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 103 (C.D. Cal. 1986), vacated, 839 F.2d 663, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1686
(Fed. Cir. 1988). This award was vacated after Smith's reorganization under bankruptcy laws
was approved, and the parties settled. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 839 F.2d 663,
664, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1686, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Smith reportedly settled with Hughes
for $95 million. John Holusha, Kodak Told It Must Pay $909 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990,
at 33.
15. Holusha, supra note 14, at 33. The settlement terms are also reflected in the final
judgment, entered by consent, in the case. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.,
Nos. 84-333-LON, 84-334-LON, 84-335-LON, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11113, at *5 (D. Del.
Sept. 12, 1989). The total payment was divided among the defendants with Nabisco paying
$52,936,507.90, Keebler paying $52,936,507.95, and Frito-Lay paying $19,126,984.15. Id.
This case, known as "The Great Cookie War," involved Procter & Gamble's patent for a
dual-dough, dual-textured cookie recipe. Elsa C. Arnett, However This Cookie Crumbles, Recipe's
Now All Duncan Hines; 3 Competitors Agree To Pay $125 Million Settlement, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
1989, at Cl. Nabisco, Keebler, and Frito-Lay were defendants. Id. The suit, originally filed in
June 1984, went through an involved history before being settled in 1989. Id.; see Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 759, 773, 776, 777, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1243, 1251, 1256 (D. Del. 1989) (granting summary judgment on issue of invalidity of one
product claim of patent, denying summary judgment on issue of invalidity of certain method
claims of patent, and denying summary judgment on issue of inequitable conduct of Procter &
Gamble before Patent and Trademark Office).
16. Andrew Pollack,Japanese Fight Back as U.S. Companies Press Patent Claims, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1992, at 1, 34 (discussing ways in which Japanese companies are recognizing signifi-
cance of and responding to large patent verdicts). Pollack suggests that the large royalties
being recovered by American companies in the voluntary licensing of their patents, while
impressive in terms of near-term dollars, may portend a slackening in product competitive-
ness on the part of the licensors. Id at 34.
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CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN PATENT DAMAGES
This Article will review the major developments of the past dec-
ade in patent damages law and will comment on some of the more
important unresolved issues.' 7 Part I addresses the controlling stat-
utory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 284. Part II discusses the changes
brought about in the last decade regarding recovery of lost profits in
patent-infringement cases, including recovery of (a) losses due to
price erosion forced by the infringement and (b) losses due to in-
ability of the patentee to consummate normal collateral sales of un-
patented goods. Part III treats recovery of an established royalty.
Part IV develops the modern law on "reasonable royalty" and
points out the shortcomings resulting from the presence of the
many artificial premises engrafted by case law onto the concept of
hypothetical negotiation. Part V deals with the problem of deduc-
tion for income taxes that "would have" accrued on each year's
damages had they been collected right away. Finally, Part VI de-
scribes the law regarding awards of prejudgment interest.
I. THE CONTROLLING STATUTE
Like most milestones in world history, the changes in patent dam-
ages law in the last decade have not involved any grand new ideas,
but rather derive from an increased understanding of concepts in-
herent in a fairly old statute.' 8 The damages section of the patent
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, has not been amended since its passage in
1952.19 The section still provides for an award adequate to com-
pensate the patent owner for an infringement of his or her patent,
but in no event will the award be less than a reasonable royalty.
2 0
Courts have long recognized that this statutory provision pre-
cludes recovery of an infringer's profits as such. In 1964, the
17. The following topics, while important components of possible monetary recovery in
patent actions, are beyond the coverage of this Article: enhanced damages (see 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1988)); costs (see 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)); and attorney's fees (see 35 U.S.C. § 285
(1988)).
18. See, e.g., infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (explaining shift of burden from
plaintiff to defendant in proving absence of noninfringing substitutes); infra notes 108-17 and
accompanying text (noting that last decade has established that damages are recoverable for
forced reduction in price); infra notes 151-74 and accompanying text (discussing new perspec-
tive on reasonable royalty as means of doing justice).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty
for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either





THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:691
Supreme Court, in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co.,21 stated, "[T]he present statutory rule is that only 'damages'
may be recovered. These have been defined by this Court as 'com-
pensation for the pecuniary loss [the patent holder] has suffered
from the infringement, without regard to the question whether the
defendant has gained or lost by his [or her] unlawful acts.' ",22 Aro is
important not only for its negation of recoverability of the defend-
ant's profits, but also for its enunciation of the statutory focus on
compensation for harm done to the patentee. 23 Today, this focus is
as valid in the realm of reasonable royalty awards as it is in the re-
covery of lost profits, as will be developed below.
Section 284 sets a reasonable royalty as the floor for recovery in
all cases. 24 No patentee can be relegated to only a reasonable roy-
alty award except in cases where trial evidence admits of no higher
mode of compensation.25 The damages provided for by the statute
are "adequate to compensate" a patentee for an infringement but
are not limited by any structured formula.26 Given the nearly infi-
nite variety of commercial and industrial circumstances under which
patent infringement occurs, it should not be surprising that courts
refuse to constrain patentees to narrow rules of methodology in fig-
uring damages for infringement. Rather, reasonableness of the
compensation for the injury done to the patentee is the overall crite-
21. 377 U.S. 476, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (1964).
22. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507, 141 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 681, 694 (1964) (quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895)).
23. Cases since Aro confirm that the focus of a patent damages award is on a patentee's
losses and the harm caused by infringement and not an infringer's profits. Thus, an infringer
is liable for a patentee's loss of profits due to price cuts forced by the infringement. See infra
notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing award of lost profits due to patentees' price
cuts forced by infringers). Infringers could also be liable for patentees' lost profits for unpat-
ented goods that would have been sold with the patented goods. See infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text (discussing award of lost profits for patentees' failure to sell related unpat-
ented goods). Likewise, a reasonable royalty award is generally higher than what would have
been theoretically negotiated so that a patentee is compensated for the injustice caused by
infringement. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (demonstrating that reasonable
royalty award is generally higher than amount of damages that actually would have been
negotiated).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); see also Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc.,
750 F.2d 1552, 1568, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 270 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that although
reasonable royalty is not necessarily measure of damages, such level of recovery serves none-
theless as floor beneath which damages may not fall); Deere & Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1558 n.9, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481,487 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that
35 U.S.C. § 284 prescribes reasonable royalty as minimum permissible measure of damages);
Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583, 217 U.S.P.QJ (BNA) 977, 981 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (holding that reasonable royalty is "floor below which damages shall not fall").
25. See, e.g., infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (illustrating that under some cir-
cumstances, reasonable royalty provides higher level of damages than lost profits).
26. Compare infra notes 31-125 and accompanying text (explaining patent damages award
based on lost profits) with infra notes 128-208 and accompanying text (explaining patent dam-
ages award based on established or reasonable royalty).
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rion, and within this concept trial courts have been accorded wide
latitude to choose a compensation mode that appears to them to fit
the evidence presented. 27 The analysis used by courts in patent
cases has thus moved closer to that used by courts in other types of
tort cases. 28 The concept is to compensate patentees fully for their
loss of exclusivity by whatever rationale seems best to fit the evi-
dence on that point at trial. Patent damage cases fall into two broad
categories, which may be labeled lost profits recovery29 and reason-
able royalty recovery.8 0
II. LOST PROFITS RECOVERY
A patentee can lose profits due to infringement in any or all of a
host of different ways. 31 Assuming the patented subject matter is a
product, these ways include:
0 patentee's potential sales of the invention lost due to the
infringement;
3 2
27. For example, in Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 994, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338, 1352 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g granted, 882 F.2d 1583 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc),
reh'g denied and opinion reinstated, 892 F.2d 73 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (in banc), the Federal Circuit
noted, "Jury damage awards, unless clearly unreasonable or based on error in law, are not
readily modified or retried." Id. A similar deference applies where the district court, sitting
without a jury, finds the facts. See Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1482, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that "the methodology of assessing
and computing damages is committed to the sound discretion of the district courts"); see also
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 157B-77, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that computation of damages is committed to sound
discretion of district court), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp.,
789 F.2d 895, 898-99, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 526-27 (Fed. Cir.) (concluding that district
court has discretion to determine proper approach to calculation of damages), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986).
28. See 8 LIPsCOMB, supra note 2, § 27:8, at 26 (noting that infringer is tortfeasor and that
patentee is entitled, like any other owner, to be compensated for property tortiously taken).
29. See infra notes 31-125 and accompanying text (discussing criteria for patent infringe-
ment award based on lost profits).
30. See infra notes 128-208 and accompanying text (discussing criteria for patent in-
fringement award based on established or reasonable royalty).
31. The general law on recovery of lost profits is not limited to recovery for sales di-
verted by the defendant-infringer. In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (1964), the Supreme Court stated the patent damages rule
broadly: "The question to be asked in determining damages is 'how much had the Patent
Holder... suffered by the infringement. And that question [is] primarily: had the Infringer
not infringed, what would [the) Patent Holder ... have made?' " Id. at 507, 141 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 694 (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., Inc., 251 F.2d 469, 471, 116
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1958)).
32. See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 847, 23
U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1481, 1491-92 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that test of entitlement to lost
profits is whether patentee would have made defendant's sales of infringing product); Uni-
royal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545-46, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432, 1437
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that where no acceptable noninfringing substitutes were in market,
plaintiff should recover lost profit on all of defendant's infringing sales); Marsh-McBirney,
Inc. v. Montedoro-Whitney Corp., 882 F.2d 498, 505, 11 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1794, 1798 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), cert. granted and vacated on procedural grounds, 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991) (ruling that
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* patentee's sales of the invention made at prices eroded because
of the infringement;
33
* patentee's sales of the invention not made at new, higher prices
that the market would have sustained absent the infringement;
3 4
* lost tag-along sales of unpatented products, which the evidence
could show would have flowed with the patentee's patented
sales;3
5
* patentee company's corporate growth restricted as a result of the
infringement and the ensuing litigation.
36
In a given case, any or all of the above factors may stand proved
by the evidence at the end of trial. If so, each factor is established
by law to be a ground for recovery. This development came about
by way of a change in the burden of proof required to recover lost
profits3 7 and a relaxation of the specific elements that need to be
proven.38
A. Change in Required Quantum of Prooffor Lost Profits Recovery
The quantum of proof required to show a right to recover lost
profits has undergone a distinct metamorphosis in the last decade.
patentee is entitled to recover lost profits if reasonable probability is shown that, but for in-
fringement, patentee would have made infringer's sales) (citing Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v.
Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326, 5 U.S.PQ.2d (BNA) 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
33. The fairly commonly encountered fact pattern is one wherein the infringer undercuts
the patentee's price and the patentee is obliged to match the lower price in order to prevent
market share erosion. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 409 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (defining reduction in profit margin as proper mea-
sure of lost profits), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093,
1102 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming district court finding that infringer's activity kept patentee's
company from raising its prices); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 902, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 529 (Fed. Cir.) (approving $100 per unit award to patent owner as com-
pensation for having to keep prices down due to infringement), cerl denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986).
35. See, e.g., Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1144, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1828, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating usual rule that, for profits on unpatented accessory items
to be recoverable, "[tihere must be a reasonable probability that the patentee would have
made the sale of the [accessory] had the defendant not made the infringing sale") (citing
Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 554, 222 U.S.P., (BNA) 4, 7
(Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing damages for
loss of related sales of unpatented goods).
36. See Lam, Inc. v.Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1067-68, 219 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
670, 677-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming damages award to patent owner corporation based on
slowed corporate growth resulting from infringement as well as from financial and human
resource drains attendant to lawsuit that followed).
37. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (exploring ways in which Federal Circuit
has relaxed burden of proof required to demonstrate right to lost profits).
38. See infra notes 45-107 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's relaxation
of specific elements necessary to demonstrate right to lost profits).
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Before the advent of the Federal Circuit, defendants and courts
were quick to enumerate all the possible outcomes that could have
ensued had no infringement occurred, other than the possibility
that the patent owners would have made the infringing sales them-
selves.8 9 The burden of proof on a patentee was severe, as illus-
trated by the following 1977 language of the Court of Claims in
Tektronix, Inc. v. United States:40 "If lost profits are ever to be
awarded.., it should be only after the strictest proof that the paten-
tee would actually have earned and retained those sums in its sales
"41
By contrast, the Federal Circuit has made clear that a "reasonable
probability" that a patentee would have made an infringer's sales
will support a recovery of lost profits.42 In terms of the quantum of
proof required, the burden of proving the existence of lost profits is
no more severe than the patentee's burden of proving any other as-
pect of damages, which is by a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard.43 Patent owners need show by such a preponderance only
that it is more likely than not that, absent the infringement, they
would have made the sales in question or that some other form of
lost profits has in fact occurred.44
39. See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 646-48
(1914) (noting that patentee failed to show that defendant's infringement resulted in lost
profits by patentee and that infringer's sales might have gone to others); Seymour v. McCor-
mick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 483 (1853) (stating that only actual damages are to be awarded
and that patentee failed to show capacity to meet demand for patented product); Bendix
Corp. v. United States, 676 F.2d 606, 614 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (finding that lost profits are looked
upon disfavorably and are only awarded upon compelling showing that patentee would have
met demand and retained profit claimed).
40. 552 F.2d 343, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048, 200
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 704 (1978).
41. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385, 391
(Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 704 (1978). A pre-Federal
Circuit commentator described the plaintiff's burden of proof as "extremely heavy." Stroup,
supra note 2, at 376. The writer further stated, "The courts that have awarded lost profits
have required that a strong showing be made through the use of detailed market informa-
tion." Id.
42. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 402, 409 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that reasonable probability is sufficient showing to
prove existence of damages and that trial court must have reasonable flexibility in awarding
lost profits), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,
735 F.2d 549, 555, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4, 8 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that burden is one of
reasonable probability, with doubts resolved against infringer).
43. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1924-25 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that amount of patentee's dam-
ages is finding of fact requiring proof by preponderance of evidence); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-
Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 275, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 357 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
that patentee must prove by preponderance of evidence that infringer caused patentee's lost
profits).
44. See supra notes 42-43 (providing examples of Federal Circuit decisions that establish
requisite burden for proving lost profits).
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B. Relaxation of Panduit Four-Prong Test for Lost Profits Recovery
Relaxation of the standard of proof merely marks the beginning
of the changes in the law on lost profits. Prevailing thinking held for
many years that the causation aspect of lost profits, which views in-
fringement as the factor causing the patentee to lose profits, had to
be proven by a four-prong test set forth by the Sixth Circuit in
Panduit v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc. 45 The test required a
plaintiff to prove causation by establishing (1) the existence of de-
mand for the patent owner's product in the marketplace; (2) the ab-
sence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes; (3) the patent owner's
ability to meet the demand; and (4) the amount of profit that the
patent owner would have earned if he or she had made the sales that
the infringer actually made.46 The Federal Circuit mentioned these
four factors with approval in 1983 in Central Soya Co. v. George A.
Hormel & Co.47 At that time, courts viewed these factors as the sine
qua non for awarding lost profits recoveries.
48
The first Panduit prong, demand for the patented product, has sel-
dom proven difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy. Plaintiffs could readily
meet the prong by providing proof of sales by patentees and their
licensees, as well as by the infringers.49 The parties' combined sales
of goods covered by the patent are generally substantial enough in
the typical patent infringement case to prove the presence of de-
mand for the patented product.50 If no demand existed, the lawsuit
would probably not exist either.
45. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978) (ChiefJudge Markey, from
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), sitting by designation).
46. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q_
(BNA) 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978) (CCPA ChiefJudge Markey sitting by designation).
47. 723 F.2d 1573, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48. See, e.g., Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1555, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431, 432 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (requiring proof of Panduit elements to determine
whether to award lost profits); Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549,
552, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (relying on four-part Panduit test as basis for
determining existence of lost profits); Central Soya Co. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d
1573, 1578, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 494 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (requiring that patentee present
affirmative proof of each of four Panduit elements to recover lost profits).
49. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that requirement of demand for prod-
uct is met by noting sales by infringer and patentee), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
50. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 n.3,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1926 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that plaintiff met first prong by
simply noting defendant's infringing sales); State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1578, 12 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1029 (finding requirement of demand for product satisfied by high sales volume of
patentee and infringer); Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616,
222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 663 (Fed. Cir.) (concluding that infringer's sales of patented inven-
tion and licenses for production and use of invention by two other corporations proved exist-
ence of demand), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984); Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 552, 222 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) at 6 (stating that sales by patentee and infringer during period in question satisfy first
Panduit prong).
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The second prong of Panduit, the absence of acceptable nonin-
fringing substitutes, has proven the most troublesome prong by far
for plaintiffs to prove. This prong, previously believed to be a strict
requirement for recovery of lost profits, accounts for more appellate
litigation and more attempted rationalization by the Federal Circuit
than any other aspect of patent damages law.5 1
Early on, the Federal Circuit constricted the scope of products
that could be considered acceptable noninfringing substitutes. In
Radio Steel & Manufacturing Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,52 a Federal Cir-
cuit panel held that substitute wheelbarrows incorporating some but
not all of the elements of a patent claim did not constitute an accept-
able substitute.5 3 The court asserted that because the totality of the
wheelbarrow elements and their interaction were the items that
were patented, some lesser assembly and functionality could not be
regarded as an "acceptable noninfiinging substitute. '54 In TWM
Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp.,55 the court followed a similar philos-
ophy on acceptable substitutes by holding that" '[a] product lacking
the advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a substitute
"acceptable" to the consumer who wants those advantages.' "56
The import of these holdings was difficult to measure, because
unpatented substitutes virtually never have all the attributes or de-
sirable qualities that validly patented inventions do. Hence, courts
prior to 1991 almost always held that the patentee satisfied the sec-
ond prong of Panduit.57 Clarification of the problem and enuncia-
tion of its partial resolution took another five years.
By 1991, the Federal Circuit began to see the problems posed by
the literal wording of Panduit's second prong. In that year, the court
decided Slimfold Manufacturing Co. v. Kinkead Industries, Inc. ,58 which
involved a patent on spring-loaded rod assemblies attached to fold-
51. See Skenyon & Porcelli, supra note 2, at 779 (stating that second prong is most heavily
litigated question in lost profits cases).
52. 788 F.2d 1554, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
53. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1556, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 431, 432-33 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
54. Id.
55. 789 F.2d 895, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
56. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 529
(Fed. Cir.) (quoting Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1162, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 734), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986).
57. See, e.g., TWM, 795 F.2d at 901, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 525 (finding that mere exist-
ence of competing noninfringing substitute does not make substitute acceptable where al-
leged substitute does not have all benefits of patented device); Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 1556,
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 432-33 (finding that substitute that did not incorporate all advantages
of patented product is not acceptable substitute); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1162 n.9, 197 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 734 n.9 (stating that knowing infringement suggests absence of acceptable nonin-
fringing substitutes).
58. 932 F.2d 1453, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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ing metal closet doors.59 Both parties sold the complete doors, with
the patented assemblies attached. 60 Following a victory on the va-
lidity and infringement issues at the district court level, 61 the suc-
cessful patentee wanted his damages to be based upon lost profits
on the full door assemblies, measured by the relative market shares
of the two parties.62 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to award lost profits,63 however, noting that the old way of
fixing rods to the doors was still an available and viable alternative
to which the defendant could have returned, or stayed, had there
been no infringement. 64 The court found no evidence that custom-
ers, in making their purchase decisions, cared at all about the pres-
ence of the patented hardware on the doors; instead, the invention's
value resided primarily in a modest cost savings in manufacturing.6 5
The case thus demonstrated that the Federal Circuit viewed "ac-
ceptability" in Panduit's second prong in terms of customer mindset
rather than in terms of the technical superiority of a patented
invention.
Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.,66 also de-
cided in 1991, clarified the situation further. The case involved en-
vironmentally enhanced production plants for making asphalt.67 In
attempting to tread the Panduit route to lost profits, the patentee
argued that competing plants that lacked features of his invention
were "unacceptable" infringers. 68 The jury returned a verdict
based on lost profits, and the district court entered judgment on the
59. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1455, 18 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
60. See id at 1456, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844-45 (noting that soon after patentee's
doors went on market, defendant began selling nearly identical doors, with only minor
improvements).
61. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 493, 499, 229 U.S.P.0,
(BNA) 298, 302 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (dismissing defendant's claim ofnoninfringenient), aft'd, 810
F.2d 1113, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus.,
Inc., 600 F. Supp. 1015, 1023, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505, 512 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing
defendant's claim that plaintiff's patent was invalid).
62. See Slimfold, 932 F.2d at 1458, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (presenting patentee's
argument that district court erroneously failed to award lost profits based on market share).
63. Id.
64. See id. (noting that parties' market shares were not affected after introduction of new
product using patented assembly).
65. Id. at 1458-59, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
66. 953 F.2d 1360, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, No. 91-1808,
1992 LEXIS 5595 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992).
67. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1364, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that patentee's invention reduced pol-
lution and product degradation normally associated with asphalt production), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 60 (1992).
68. Id. at 1373, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (crediting patentee's argument that com-
peting product lacking advantages of patented product is not acceptable substitute where
buyer wants those advantages).
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verdict.69 The Federal Circuit in turn affirmed this aspect of the
judgment.70 The court held that the patent owner could prove the
absence of "acceptable" substitutes in the Panduit sense by showing
either: "(1) the purchasers in the marketplace generally were will-
ing to buy the patented product for its advantages, or (2) the specific
purchasers of the infringing product purchased on that basis."
71
The court found that, based on the evidence presented to the dis-
trict court, reasonable jurors could have concluded that the second
of these alternatives was present and that the defendant's customers
bought the products at issue because of the products' environmen-
tal advantages.
72
Slimfold and Standard Havens reflect the Federal Circuit's signifi-
cant clarification of the meaning of "acceptable" in Panduit's second
prong. Prior to these decisions, it might have been thought that to
be "acceptable" in the Panduit sense meant that the noninfringing
product had to have all the features and advantages of the patented
invention. One wondered how it could be "noninfringing" in that
circumstance. Slimfold and Standard Havens signified that a distinc-
tion needs to be drawn between two broad categories of situations:
first, where customers in fact purchase the patented product because
of its advantages over the prior art; and second, where customers in
fact purchase, or accept as a free go-along item, the patented prod-
uct without regard to its actual or supposed advantages. The new
cases clarify that in the first situation, the emergence of an "accepta-
ble" noninfringing substitute will be rare-to-never because custom-
ers buy for the advantages of the invention. In the second situation,
many noninfringing devices could be factually "acceptable" because
consumers either do not know or do not care about benefits of the
patented arrangement.
A considerable problem with acceptable substitutes remains, how-
ever. The wording of the second Panduit prong suggests that the
mere presence of any "acceptable" (as now evolved in the case law)
substitute in the market would cause a forfeiture of the patentee's
right to recover any lost profits by the Panduit route.73 Perhaps the
69. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., No. 88-1209-CV-W-3, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9389, at *1, *9 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 1989).
70. Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1373, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. Thejudgment was
reversed with respect to the quantity of infringing plants involved. Id. at 1374, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1332.
71. Id. at 1373, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
72. Id
73. Courts have gotten around the literal wording of Panduit's second prong, which re-
quires the plaintiff to prove "absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes," Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 730 (6th
Cir. 1978), in a number of ways. See, e.g., supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text (discussing
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court in Panduit did not intend this result. The fact that some ac-
ceptable substitutes are present in the market should not preclude
recovery for the portion of the defendant's infringing sales that
would not have gone to those substitutes. Indeed, the case law is
evolving in such a direction.
For example, in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. ,74 a
patent owner sought to obtain a proportion of an infringer's sales
income based on market share as a lost profits recover), and a rea-
sonable royalty for the rest of the defendant's sales. 75 Both the dis-
trict court and the Federal Circuit sanctioned this approach. 76 In
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 77 the Federal Circuit com-
mented approvingly on State Industries' "market share approach" for
use in cases where the approach is factually appropriate. 78 The mar-
ket share method is thus one way of addressing the awkward word-
ing of Panduit's second prong. After State Industries, that prong can
be read as absence of noninfringing substitutes that would have to-
tally absorbed all the infringer's sales, or as absence of noninfring-
ing substitutes that were so desirable that the patentee cannot prove
he or she would have made any sales against them. In this way, the
second prong precludes recovery only where noninfringing substi-
tutes completely account for the infringer's sales.
In 1991, a panel of the Federal Circuit in Kaufman Co. v. Lantech,
Inc.79 reversed a district court decision restricting lost profits to
eight of forty-four infringing sales because the patentee was unable
to prove that the remaining thirty-six sales would have gone to him
and not to noninfringing substitutes.80 In reversing, the appellate
panel extended the rule resolving doubts as to amount of damages
cases clarifying what constitutes "acceptable" substitute); infra notes 74-78 and accompanying
text (noting that courts permit award based on market share even where acceptable substi-
tutes are present); infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (illustrating ways in which courts
shift onus to infringer to prove that infringing sales would have gone to noninfringing
substitutes).
74. 883 F.2d 1573, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1022 (1990).
75. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577-78, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
76. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1971, 1980 (E.D.
Tenn. 1988) (approving market share approach), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 883 F.2d
1573, 1577-78, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's
use of market share approach), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
77. 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
78. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 847, 23 U.S.P.Q,2d
(BNA) 1481, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (urging use of market share approach to determine what
proportion of infringer's sales would have gone to patentee). The court remanded the case
for a determination of that question by the district court. Id.
79. 926 F.2d 1136, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
80. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828,
1831 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1993] CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN PATENT DAMAGES 705
against the infringer81 and held that a showing by the patentee that
some of the infringer's sales would have gone to the patentee but
for the infringement is sufficient to shift the onus onto the infringer
as to the remainder of the infringer's sales.
8 2
The Federal Circuit has suggested other ways to help patentees
get past the seemingly all-or-nothing result of Panduit's second
prong. Most notably, the court in Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley
Corp.83 announced a new inference on the subject. The district
court, after finding an absence of acceptable noninfringing substi-
tutes, awarded lost profits to the patent owner on eighty percent of
the defendant's infringing sales and a reasonable royalty on the re-
mainder of the sales based on the parties' relative market shares.
84
In effect the court was saying that twenty percent of the sales would
have gone to unacceptable substitutes. 85 The Federal Circuit va-
81. Id. at 1141-42, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831-32. This rule dates back at least to
Story Parchment Paper Co. v. Paterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), which held that
exactitude with respect to the amount of a patent infringer's illegally earned profits was not
required and that doubts as to the amount would be resolved against the infringer. Story
Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563. The rule seems to have been extended to patent damages now
that the remedy of an accounting for the infringer's profits is no longer available. See supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text (examining Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., Supreme Court case requiring that proof of damages due to infringement focus on
patentee's loss, not on infringer's gain); see also Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Drag-
lines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 655, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Story Parchment,
282 U.S. at 563, as support for holding that risk of uncertainty in amount of patent damages is
thrown upon wrongdoer/infringer), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985). Still more recently, the
Federal Circuit has applied Story Parchment in an even broader way, not only to the damages
calculation, but also to the fundamental factual bases for recovery, for example under the
Panduit four-prong test. See Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 826 n.6, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (ruling that if in doubt on entitlement to
lost profits under Panduit, court would resolve doubt against defendant under Story Parchment),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
82. Kaufman, 926 F.2d at 1141-42, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831-32. The court cited
Lam, Inc. v.Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 675 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), and Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 554, 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 4, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1984), as illustrations of "the pervading principle that doubt in ascer-
taining appropriate damages comes down against the infringer." Kaufman, 926 F.2d at 1141,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. The origins of this "principle" lie in equitable accountings for
infringers' profits, a remedy abolished by the 1946 Patent Act. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Converti-
ble Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 506-07, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681,694 (1964) (stating
that 1946 Patent Act allows patentee to collect damages, not infringer's profits). The exten-
sion of the principle is readily apparent in modern cases. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-
Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432, 1437-38 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(shifting onus to defendant to prove award should be limited to market share); Kaufman Co.
v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1831-32 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that showing by patentee that some of infringer's sales would have gone to patentee
but for infringement shifts burden to infringer that remainder of infringer's sales would not
have gone to patentee). The principle has the effect, perhaps improperly, of shifting a sub-
stantial portion of the burden of proving damages to the defendant.
83. 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
84. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 1200 (D. Conn.
1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
85. See id. (awarding lost profits on 80% of infringing sales based on patentee's market
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cated, holding that satisfaction of Panduit's second prong as to some
sales gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that all of the infringer's
sales would have gone to the patentee. 86 The court thus cast the
burden upon the infringer to prove how many of its sales would
have gone to noninfringing substitutes had there been no infringe-
ment in the first place. 87 This aspect of Uniroyal represents a major
alleviation of the plaintiff's burden of proof in lost profits cases. 8
The third prong of Panduit's four-prong proof pattern for lost
profits recovery, the patentee's ability to meet the demand for his or
her patented product, is and remains a requirement for lost profits
to be recovered. 89 The patentee's "ability to meet demand" is un-
derstood, however, not as requiring the patent owner to have imme-
diate plant capacity. Rather, patentees may satisfy this prong by
showing that they could have subcontracted the production work9 °
or that their facilities were adequate or could have been made ade-
quate to meet demand for the patented product.9 1 Courts have held
evidence to be sufficient where the patentee showed that he or she
bought the product from an outside source, developed the market
for it, aggressively protected that market, and intended to meet de-
share, notwithstanding absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes). The case highlights
the problem of Panduit's black-and-white characterization of the second prong, which often
does not comport with commercial reality and is now contrary to established case law. See
infra note 164 and accompanying text (illustrating propriety of dividing recovery between lost
profits and reasonable royalty by providing multiple Federal Circuit decisions that sanction
such result).
86. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1432, 1437-38 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The court noted that the defendant, Uniroyal, had not
presented evidence rebutting this presumption. Id. at 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
87. Id. at 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38 (finding that burden shifts to defendant
to prove award should be restricted to market share once patentee establishes absence of
acceptable substitutes).
88. Compare id. at 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38 (requiring defendant to prove
that patentee's award of lost profits should be restricted to market share) with Uniroyal, 13
U.S.P..2d (BNA) at 1200 (requiring in district court that patentee prove that award should
not be restricted to market share).
89. See, e.g., Datascope Corp., 879 F.2d at 826-27, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-26 (deny-
ing damages for infringer's foreign sales where patentee lacked business structure to exploit
overseas demand for product); Kori Corp., 761 F.2d at 653-55, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 987-89
(stating that in two-supplier market, patentees are entitled to recover lost profits upon show-
ing that they would have made sales but for infringement, thus requiring ability to meet de-
mand for product); Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.21 604, 616, 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 663 (Fed. Cir.) (adopting trial court's requirement that patentee possess
"at least potential manufacturing and marketing capabilities to obtain the infringing sales"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984); Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 553-54, 222 U.S.P.QJ (BNA) at 7-8
(holding that proof that patentee was reasonably likely to have made infringer's sales requires
showing that patentee could have met demand for product).
90. See, e.g., Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 554, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (reasoning that demand
could be met by subcontracting production of patented product, which would result in no
"serious adverse effect" on overall profit margin).
91. See, e.g., Bio-Rad, 739 F.2d at 616, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 663 (agreeing with trial
court that patentee need only possess potential marketing and manufacturing capabilities to
meet demand).
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mand even if the supplier failed to meet its contractual supply obli-
gations.92 The Federal Circuit has justified these loose approaches
to the Panduit standard by noting several times that the Panduit reci-
tations are not the sole means by which courts can analyze whether a
patentee may recover lost profits.
93
There is a certain interplay between a finding on Panduit's second
prong, the absence of noninfringing substitutes, and Panduit's third
prong, the patentee's marketing and manufacturing capability to
meet increased demand. In Uniroyal, the Federal Circuit held that
the district court's finding of absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes was inconsistent with the court's restriction of the plain-
tiff's lost profits recovery to its market share level of eighty per-
cent. 94 On the other hand, in Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc.,95 the
Federal Circuit ruled that the lost profits on the foreign portion of
an infringer's sales were properly denied, even though no accepta-
ble noninfringing alternatives existed, because the plaintiff did not
show that it had a business structure in the countries in question to
handle the sales. 96 Accordingly, the "no acceptable substitutes"
finding is made on the premise that the plaintiff is capable of supply-
ing customers' needs; if not, the class of things labeled "acceptable"
may enlarge as to the nonsupplied customers. Plaintiffs must con-
tinue to satisfy the independent requirement of ability to meet de-
mand for a patented product, notwithstanding a showing of the
general absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes.
9 7
92. See, e.g., Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 276-77, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 352, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that ability to meet demand was demonstrated in
cases where company had developed market that it aggressively protected, even though com-
pany was obliged to rely on contractual supplier for company to continue producing patented
product).
93. See infra note 102 (listing several cases in which Federal Circuit has indicated that
Panduit is merely one means of proving lost profits).
94. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1432, 1437-38 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Recall that in State Industries, where market share was success-
fully applied, the plaintiff stipulated that it was not seeking lost profits beyond its market share
of 40%. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
95. 879 F.2d 820, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
96. Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 826-27, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
97. An open question remains whether to be "acceptable," the substitute actually has to
have been commercially sold. Defendants' lawyers complain that if this is required, common
sources of noninfringing substitutes such as expired patents, textbook publications, and the
like will wrongly be eliminated from the store of knowledge to which a defendant could turn.
For example, in the context of a reasonable royalty determination in Panduit, the infringer-
defendant argued and the master found that acceptable substitutes were present in the market
but not sold by Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works during the relevant time period. Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 732 (6th
Cir. 1978). The district court agreed. Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed on this point, pointing
out that Stahlin Brothers' "post-hoc" adoption of the substitute only when forced to do so by
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Moving to the fourth prong of Panduit, the amount of the paten-
tee's lost profits, the Federal Circuit has once again aided the pat-
entee. In 1984, the court held in Paper Converting Machine Co. v.
Magna-Graphics Corp. 98 that the profits to which a patentee is entitled
are incremental profits, or profits that exclude fixed costs.99 The
court concisely characterized this approach as follows:
[This] approach recognizes that it does not cost as much to pro-
duce unit N+ 1 if the first N (or fewer) units produced already
have paid the fixed costs. Thus fixed costs-those costs which do
not vary with increases in production, such as management sala-
ries, property taxes, advertising, and insurance-are excluded
when determining profits.' 00
Depending on the industry, recoverable profit margins can easily be
doubled by exclusion of fixed costs. All that is needed for such a
result to obtain under the foregoing authority is to have fixed costs
equalling or exceeding variable costs. In high overhead industries
this might be possible.10 1 A defendant's liability for a particular sale
under these circumstances can easily exceed any net profit he or she
will earn on that sale. Consider the following example: Fixed costs,
principally advertising campaigns and marketing overhead, may run
the district court's injunction militates against the argued acceptability. id. at 1162, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 734-35. Patentees' attorneys argue, on the other hand, that these so-called
substitutes are nothing but artificial hindsight havens for guilty infringers, are nearly always
unproven in practical experience, and are fraught with imperfections that only the harsh real-
ity of marketplace existence could bring out. See, e.g., Central Soya Co. v. George A. Hormel
& Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1579, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 494 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that
defendant has burden of proving availability of acceptable noninfringing substitutes on mar-
ket). Both sides' arguments have merit. The question should be resolved by the trier of fact
in each case, possibly with some shifting of the burden of proof to defendants who assert that
a particular untried noninfringing substitute would in fact have been viable technologically
and attractive to their customers.
98. 745 F.2d 11, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
99. See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magua-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming trial court's decision to apply incremen-
tal income approach and stating that fixed costs are excluded under this approach).
100. Id.
101. For other cases upholding the award of incremental profits, see Kalman v. Berlyn
Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485, 16 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1093, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that
where district court based lost profits award on calculation that made no deduction for direct
labor costs, such award is not clearly erroneous in view of testimony that patentee could have
produced additional items without increase in work force or working hours); Bio-Rad Lab.,
Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 617, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 664 (Fed. Cir.)
(approving incremental profits approach that excludes all of patentee's costs except direct
selling expenses, labor, and materials), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984). This methodology
cannot, however, be stretched so far as to lose its logical core. In Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1522 (D. Mass. 1990), the court refused to award any
lost profits as to certain film sales. The court awarded lost profits based on higher fixed costs
as to other film sales. Id at 1528; see also State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d
1573, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming incremental profits
calculation, but only after noting that likelihood of rise in fixed costs was "minimal"), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990). Those advising clients about patent infringement risks should
pay particular attention to this factor in the new equation of patent liability.
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90% of revenue for an item like a patented household soap formula-
tion. Suppose the soap sells at wholesale for $0.60 per bar. Fixed
costs would then be $0.54. Variable costs, e.g., labor, materials, and
shipping, are so called because they vary rather directly with vol-
ume. Suppose in our soap example they run 5% of revenue, or
$0.03, leaving a 5% net profit, also $0.03.
If an infringer diverts sales of this soap from the patentee, the
infringer will be liable for $0.60 (lost revenue) minus $0.03 (variable
costs), or $0.57 per bar. The defendant infringer, if he had similar
costs to the patentee's, has quite likely thought of himself as "mak-
ing" only $0.03 per bar on his infringing activities, and may have
wrongly assumed that his liability will be merely some fraction of
three cents per bar. The large discrepancy between the actual liabil-
ity (if the patentee proves his entitlement to lost profits as a prelimi-
nary matter) and what the defendant may have anticipated, is due to
the fact that virtually all of the patentee's advertisements, marketing
expenses, and other fixed costs have typically already been paid by
him. At the time of the infringement the patentee was likely in the
profitability mode, with these big expenses behind him, at least for a
period of time to come. In our example the patentee was "making"
$0.57 per bar when the infringer's activities intervened and took
these profits away. Viewed in this light, it is easy to see how the
extent of liability may be much greater than upon superficial review.
C. Emergence of Non-Panduit Analyses for Lost Profits Recovery
While Panduit is undoubtedly the most cited analysis for determin-
ing a patentee's right to recover lost profits in an infringement suit,
it is now well established that Panduit is not the only proper route to
that end. 10 2 As the case law has emerged, the overall test for entitle-
ment to lost profits has become a more generic statement. A paten-
tee must now show, on a more-than-speculative evidentiary basis,
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the infringement,
the patentee would have made the infringer's sales.10 3
102. See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods. Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1372-73,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that Panduit four-part test is "one
way to establish causation" for lost profits), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 60 (1992); SmithKline Diag-
nostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1925
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that Panduit is merely one permissible method of proving lost profits
damages, thereby implying that Panduit is not exclusive method); Carella v. Starlight Archery
& Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 141, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding
that Panduit guidelines are not exclusive standard for determining entitlement to lost profits).
103. See, e.g., State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 (requiring show-
ing that there is reasonable probability that but for infringement, patentee would have made
infringer's sales); Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 671, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1097, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that showing of reasonable probability suffices
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In making this generic showing, a patentee need not negate all
possibilities that a purchaser might have bought a different product
or might have forgone the purchase altogether. 0 4 Panduit is now
understood as setting forth merely one of several fact patterns that
meet this generic test and thus entitle a patent owner to recover lost
profits. 10 5 At least one other fact pattern also meets this "overall"
or "general causality" test. This fact pattern is exemplified by cases
in which two-supplier product markets exist. 10 6 The pattern in-
cludes situations wherein two litigants occupy an economically iden-
tifiable niche in a market.10 7 In addition, other non-Panduit fact
patterns satisfying the generic lost profits entitlement test may
emerge in the future. The likelihood is that reinterpretation of
Panduit will continue to occur as these patterns arise in an effort to
provide increasingly rational decisions in this area.
D. Infringer's Liability for Patentee's Price Cuts
It is now fairly clear that infringers are liable for any price reduc-
tions their activities may force on patentees. A price reduction rem-
edy is a form of lost profits recovery for patent owners, although
neither the four-prong Panduit test nor the generic rationale for lost
profits stated in the preceding section seems to be applicable for
determining the scope of such liability.10 8 In fact, price-reduction
and that causation need not be demonstrated to certainty), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988);
Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326, 5 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (mandating that patentee show reasonable probability that if de-
fendant had not infringed patented product, patentee would have made defendant's sales).
104. See, e.g., Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141, 17 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1828, 1832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that patentee need not negate every poss;ibility that pur-
chaser might have bought another product other than patentee's absent infringement); State
Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 (providing that lost profits recovery
does not require patentee to negate every possibility that purchaser might have bought other
product or forgone purchase altogether had there been no infringement); Paper Converting
Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 21, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591, 598 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (requiring patentee to prove that reasonable probability of sale existed but for infringe-
ment and not that patentee negate every possibility that purchaser might have bought another
product or forgone purchase altogether if not for infringement).
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that Panduit is not sole means of
establishing lost profits).
106. See, e.g., Kaufman Co., 926 F.2d at 1141, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833 (holding that
where patentee and infringer are suppliers rather than manufacturers, it is reasonable to infer
that infringer caused loss of patentee's profit); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d
1056, 1065, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that in two-supplier mar-
ket, patentee's loss is proper ground for relief).
107. See, e.g., Marsh-McBimey, Inc. v. Montedoro-Whitney Corp., 882 F.2d 498, 505, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1794, 1798-99 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that patentee and infringer occu-
pied separate niche within larger market, thus operating as equivalent of two-supplier mar-
ket), cert. granted and judgment vacated on procedural grounds, 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991).
108. Such liability is supported, however, by another part of Panduit itself and by vener-
able authority that pre-dates Panduit. In considering the price-reduction aspect of the dam-
ages in Panduit, Chief Judge Markey remarked that the right to damages caused by price
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liability appears to exist independently of whether a patentee can
show the diversion of any sales due to a patent infringement. 10 9
For example, in both Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp. 110 and King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.,1II the Federal Circuit required defend-
ants to reimburse patentees for cuts the patentees made in the
prices of their patented products to meet the defendant-infringers'
competition.' 1 2 In Lam, the patentee proved the early growth rate
of its patented product's sales and projected this growth rate
through the period of infringement. 13 The patentee then sub-
tracted its actual sales volume during the period of infringement
from its projected sales volume for that period, thereby deriving the
total dollar amount of sales lost due to the infringer's activities.'14
The Federal Circuit sustained an award based on the difference, i.e.,
including both losses due to diversion of sales to the defendant and
lower profits on the patentee's own sales due to price cuts made to
meet competition created by the infringement. 1 5 In like fashion the
Federal Circuit in King Instrument affirmed an award of lost profits
based on a patentee's preexisting profit margin at the time infringe-
ment began. 61 6 The patentee showed a depression in sales and unit
profits by reason of the infringement and was awarded damages
accordingly.
117
reductions "stands on the same ground" as damages caused by lost sales. Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 731 (6th Cir.
1978) (citing McSherry Mfg. Co. v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 163 F. 34, 35 (6th Cir. 1908), cert.
denied, 214 U.S. 512 (1909)). In Panduit, the master had denied recovery for price cut damages
because the profits lost by the cut were "more than compensated by the gain in profits due to
the increase in plaintiff's sales volume because of the price reduction." Panduit, 575 F.2d at
1157, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 730. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that this ruling was not
clearly erroneous. Jed; see also Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1886)
(providing in dictum that price cut losses are recoverable if caused by infringers); Coleman
Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 660, 663, 122 U.S.P.Q. 559, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1959) (ordering
increase in damages, based in part on losses caused by infringer's competition).
109. See Lam, 718 F.2d at 1067, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676 (awarding lost profits due to
forced price reductions separately from lost profits due to lost sales); supra note 108 (noting
language in Panduit opinion stating that lost profits due to price cuts stand on same ground as
lost profits caused by lost sales).
110. 718 F.2d 1056, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
111. 767 F.2d 853, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
112. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1057, 1057, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670,
676 (Fed. Cir. 1983); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 402, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
113. Lam, 718 F.2d at 1059-62, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 671-73.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1067, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676.
116. King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 864, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 410.
117. Id.; see also Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093,
1102 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming damage award for patentee's having to maintain low prices
where patent owner testified that he could not charge higher prices with defendant-infringer
in same market).
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The court's holdings on this point do not seem to have been rec-
ognized for the magnitude of potential liability they portend. In a
lawsuit where a patent owner is the dominant figure in the market-
place, even a small price cut caused by the presence of infringing
goods in the market can easily exceed by many times the profits-or
even the gross receipts-on the infringer's sales. Thus, although
the infringer's profits per se cannot be recovered under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284,118 amounts equal to or even substantially greater than the
infringer's profits may well be awarded in litigation between active
competitors in the same market.
E. Recovery for Loss of Profits on Collateral Sales of Unpatented Goods
The courts have now made clear that in the proper circumstances
"tag-along" or "convoyed" sales, while not directly protected by a
patent, are nevertheless fair game for damage calculations when in-
fringement is found."19 The circumstances must involve a situation
in which the causality of these collateral losses can be connected to
the infringing activities.1 20
Consider an example involving industrial emergency lighting fix-
tures. These are fixtures that might typically appear as every tenth
fixture in the ceiling of a factory. Their outward appearance is simi-
lar to that of the regular fixtures in the ceiling. The emergency fix-
tures, however, in addition to providing normal lighting under
normal conditions, have an emergency feature that provides some
minimal lighting level in the event of a power outage. The nine-out-
of-ten regular fixtures look identical to the fixtures with the emer-
gency feature, are sold by the same manufacturer, and have many
common parts. Assume that in this industry, fixture manufacturers
who receive orders for emergency fixtures always receive orders for
normal fixtures as well, not because of any tying scheme, but be-
cause it is much more convenient and aesthetic for customers to buy
all look-alike fixtures from a single source in a single order. Assume
further that the fixture with the emergency standby feature is
patented.
118. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507, 141
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681, 694 (1964) (holding that under 35 U.S.C. § 284, patentee is entitled to
recover compensation for his or her loss suffered as result of infringement without regard to
whether infringer gained or lost by infringement).
119. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (providing cases that illustrate circum-
stances under which such sales are recoverable as lost profits).
120. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 726 F.2d 853, 866, 226 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 402, 411 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that collateral losses are recoverable only where
patentee would have made collateral sale but for infringement), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
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In this example, a competitor offers an infringing version of the
emergency standby fixture, perhaps at a price ten percent less than
the patentee's price for such fixtures. The competitor also offers
matching regular fixtures. If the infringer obtains an order for the
emergency lighting fixtures, he or she will also receive an order for
the regular fixtures. The total order lost by the patentee will there-
fore be some nine or ten times the dollar volume of lost sales of the
infringing goods alone.
It now seems established that under circumstances such as these,
the patentee is entitled to recover lost profits on the entire order
because the facts show convincingly that sales of the infringing
emergency fixtures would have carried the normal fixture sales with
them. 121 Courts style this recovery as being under the "entire mar-
ket value rule." 122 This somewhat awkward expression arose from
cases where a single machine or device was being sold, containing
what was referred to as a patented "feature," along with other fea-
tures. 123 More broadly, under this rule today, patent holders may
recover lost profits as to any collateral sales that they could normally
anticipate making in combination with a patented invention,
whether the collateral sales are parts of a single product or separate
items that accompany the patented product.1 24
It is presently unclear just how far the causality factor for collat-
eral sales can reach under Federal Circuit jurisprudence. For exam-
121. See, e.g., Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591,599 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The deciding factor... is whether '[n]ormally the
patentee (or its licensee) can anticipate sale of such unpatented components as well as of the
patented' ones.") (quoting Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 351, 193 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 385, 393 (Ct. Cl. 1977)); see also Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (permitting damages for unpatented accessory
usually sold with patented product); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Litho-
graphing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1175, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that law permits damages for "convoyed" sales, meaning related sales, including those for
which no proof of infringing structure is provided); Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies &
Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming recov-
ery of lost profits from sales of infringing amphibious vehicle on ground that vehicle incorpo-
rated patented pontoon, in cases where financial and marketing dependence on patented item
provided causal link for lost profits on complete product), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
122. See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 974, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424, 439
(Ct. Cl.) (mentioning that under "entire market value" rule, it is financial and marketing de-
pendence of contested item that is significant to determination of lost profits damages), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
123. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that market value rule allows recovery for entire
apparatus containing several features when feature patented constitutes basis for customer
demand), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
124. See, e.g., State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031 (permitting
recovery for loss of sale of entire apparatus containing patented item); King Instrument, 767
F.2d at 866, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 411 (holding that profits for spare parts normally sold
with patented item are recoverable); Kori, 761 F.2d at 656, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 989 (per-
mitting recovery for lost profits on amphibious vehicles incorporating patented pontoon).
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ple, in King Instrument, the Federal Circuit held that lost profits on
spare parts normally sold as part of a package with the patented
product could be recovered, but not lost profits on spare parts sold
after the original sale where the seller could not necessarily antici-
pate the later sale. 125 No apparent reason exists for such a limita-
tion in cases such as the above example concerning lighting fixtures.
If evidence shows that an infringing sale has cost the patentee not
only the sales of noninfringing normal lighting fixtures but also of
replacement fixtures sold after the initial sale, the causality chain
would appear to be unbroken. Therefore, the recovery of lost prof-
its in an after-market such as this one should be allowed.
III. RECOVERY OF AN ESTABLISHED ROYALTY
Whether viewed as a category unto itself or as one of the Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp. 126 species of reasonable roy-
alty, the concept of an "established royalty" has undergone nearly
as much change in recent years as the law on recovery of lost profits.
Once again, the changes have favored the patent owner. 127 Typi-
cally, royalty rates stated in other licenses and other offers of
licenses continue to be proffered as one indicium of what a reason-
able royalty should be, 128 even though these royalties are often very
low. It is now settled law that a finding of "established royalty" in a
suit against a particular defendant requires evidence of a significant
number of prior licenses, each freely made, and each granted to a
licensee whose acts were commensurate in scope with the infringing
acts of the defendant.
In Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp. ,129 the Fed-
eral Circuit explained that while royalty rates offered or charged to
others are commonly applicable in setting a reasonable royalty, they
do not necessarily constitute an established royalty.130 In Deere &
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 13 1 the Federal Circuit held that a
single prelitigation license to a minor competitor at 1% royalty and
125. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 866, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402,
411 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
126. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295,
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
127. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (indicating cases where Federal Circuit
assigned patent owners damages awards that exceeded actual industry royalty figures).
128. See infra note 182 and accompanying text (documenting calculation of damages
awards based on prospective license agreements).
129. 739 F.2d 604, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984).
130. See Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 617, 222 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 654, 664 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that actual damage awards may exceed established roy-
alty), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984).
131. 710 F.2d 1551, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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two prelitigation offers to the defendant itself that were also at 1%
royalty did not preclude an award of 15% as a reasonable royalty.' 3 2
In Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 133 evidence showing offers of
licenses to manufacturers of snow-making machines at 2.5% of sales
price did not prevent the court from affirming a reasonable royalty
charge to a user-defendant in the amount of one-third of the savings
realized by that defendant in using the patented snow-making pro-
cess.' 3 4 The foregoing cases seemingly clarify that an established
royalty is now predominantly regarded as one possible species of
reasonable royalty.' 35 However, a truly established royalty is found
to exist only in conditions much more stringent than formerly re-
quired, excluding mere offers or mere licenses to nonanalogous
entities. 136
In connection with attempted proof of an established royalty, an
interesting issue arises under rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which excludes compromises and offers of compromise as
132. Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557-58, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 481,486 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (indicating approval of district court finding that license and
offers were irrelevant to determination of established royalty).
133. 718 F.2d 1075, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
134. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding mere offers to license at particular rate insufficient to deter-
mine existence of established royalty).
135. In Bio-Rad, the Federal Circuit affirmed a 33% royalty as reasonable, despite an in-
dustry standard of only 3-10%. 739 F.2d at 617, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 664. In Allen Archery,
Inc. v. Browning Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit found reversible error when the district
court applied the plaintiff's industry-wide license royalty to the wrong base. 898 F.2d 787,
789-90, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156, 1158-59 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The plaintiff's usual terms
were a certain percentage of "arms-length" selling price; the district court used the defend-
ant's intercorporate selling price within the corporate family as the basis for calculating the
appropriate royalty. Allen Archery, 898 F.2d at 790, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158-59. In Sun
Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing, Inc., the court criticized ajury instruction regarding "es-
tablished royalty" as being inapt for the facts of the case. 872 F.2d 978, 993-94, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The instruction, which the court found
"unobjectionable in the abstract," characterized an established royalty as one that (a) "was
agreed to prior to the infringement;" (b) "was paid by such a number of persons as to indicate
a general acquiescence in its reasonableness," or, if paid by one person or entity, indicates a
large-volume exclusive licensee; (c) "was not negotiated under threat of a lawsuit or in settle-
ment of a lawsuit;" and (d) "paid for comparable rights of activity under the patent." Id. If
these four requirements become established law in future cases, the dimensions of "estab-
lished royalty" will be greatly clarified.
136. Compare Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 617, 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 664 (Fed. Cir.) (explaining that actual royalty rates charged within indus-
try may be applicable in determining reasonable royalty but do not necessarily constitute es-
tablished royalty), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984) and Deere, 710 F.2d at 1557-58, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 486 (finding existing licenses and offers to license irrelevant to determina-
tion of established royalty) with Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1116-19, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 612, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (using plaintiff's widespread offer of two percent
royalty to other manufacturers as basis for established royalty rate), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051
(1978) and Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1393-94, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 438, 445
(Ct. Cl. 1972) (deriving established royalty from patentee's numerous offers and actual grants
to license invention at uniform royalty rate).
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evidence of the true value of disputed claims. 137 The issue concerns
whether prior licenses or offers of licenses under the patent in suit
should be excluded under the rule when offered as evidence of a
reasonable royalty. Licenses are often entered into in compromise
of a claim, either threatened or actually brought in court, of patent
infringement. 138 The Federal Circuit has held that rule 408 ex-
cludes license offers under the patent in suit where they are made in
the context of an existing infringement controversy.' 3 9 Even where
there is no such ongoing controversy, and rule 408 does not require
exclusion, courts have held such offers to be of little probative value
in some circumstances. 140
IV. REASONABLE ROYALTY RECOVERY
A. The Tension Within § 284
The damages section of the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284,141
contains two different focal points. First, courts must award patent
137. See FED. R. EVID. 408. The rule provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or at-
tempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount,
is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount....
This rule ... does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Id
138. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1554, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that parties negotiated license agreement
while litigation was imminent); Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d 347, 362, 212
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643, 656 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that licensing offer was motivated in part by
desire to avoid further extensive litigation); Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1116-19, 192 U.S.P.Q, (BNA)
at 618 (rejecting plaintiff's objection that established royalty rate was based on licensing
agreement that was compromise to avoid litigation).
139. See Deere, 710 F.2d at 1556-57, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 485-86 (asserting that rule 408
does not apply to offers to license uncontested patents, but rather is limited to actual disputes
over existing claims).
140. See id. at 1557, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 486 (affirming district court holding that li-
cense secured by single, minor competitor did not necessarily establish amount of damages
award). The Federal Circuit held in Deere that where the district court had excluded from
evidence a license under the patent in suit negotiated in the absence of controversy and an
offer, made before the controversy erupted, to license the patent in suit to the infringer, such
exclusions were erroneous. Id. The court found the error to be harmless, however, noting
that in the first instance, the license was negotiated against a backdrop of continuing litigation
against others, and in the second instance, the offer had been made when the patent was
untested and of uncertain validity. Id.; see also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 5 Cl.
Ct. 591, 606, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1308, 1317 (1984) (giving no evidentiary weight to license
offers and settlements made during actual dispute between parties); Hanson v. Alpine Valley
Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078-79, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (find-
ing that offers to license were insufficient to determine established royalty because offers were
made subsequent to infringement and ensuing litigation) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin
Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1164 n.1 1, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 736 n.1 1 (6th
Cir. 1978)).
141. See supra note 19 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284 in pertinent part).
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claimants "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement"
of their patents. 142 Second, such awards must be "in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer." 143 The first focus is clearly on the harm done to patent
owners; they are the ones who are entitled to be compensated.
When applying the minimum damages standard of reasonable roy-
alty, however, the statute indicates that such reasonable royalty is
for the use made of the invention by the infringer. 144 The statute's
second focus thus bears on value to the infringer and is seemingly
unrelated to the need to compensate the patent owner stressed in
the first focus. In the realm of reasonable royalty, trial evidence
commonly centers around the value of the patented invention in the
hands of the defendant.145 However, when the case is being tried
on a damage basis other than reasonable royalty, the evidentiary fo-
cus is instead on the harm to the plaintiff and on what will be re-
quired to compensate for that harm. 46
Practitioners accustomed to thinking of a reasonable royalty as
being substantially less than any arguable lost profits of the patentee
may find that such a supposition is no longer true. It is altogether
possible in certain cases that a reasonable royalty based on the value
of the invention to the defendant actually exceeds any demonstrable
pecuniary harm to the patent owner.1 47 For example, suppose the
patent owner is an upstart company with no significant customer
base. Its expenses are apt to be high, and its prices may have to be
low for market entry purposes. The company's profit is accordingly
relatively small. Suppose the infringement is by a large, well-known
company and that the infringing activities are ongoing on the date
the patent issues. If a profit sharing approach is taken to the setting
142. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Serpentix Conveyor Corp. v. Roth, 726 F. Supp. 282, 285-86, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1074, 1076 (D. Colo. 1989) (recognizing substantial value of patent to infringer but
awarding nominal reasonable royalty of only one dollar because infringer had not actually
manufactured or sold infringing product); Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 670
F. Supp. 861, 869, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1327, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (basing damage award on
finding that one-third of profits realized by infringer were likely attributable to patent owner's
invention); Bandag Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769, 770 (W.D.N.C. 1982)
(commencing analysis with detailed examination of infringer's extensive commercial use of
patent owner's tire-retreading method).
146. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)
(basing damage award on harm done to patent holder due to infringement); Skenyon &
Porcelli, supra note 2, at 763 ("[I]t is always best to think of the 'reasonable royalty' as ...
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.").
147. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (indicating that reasonable royalty award
may actually exceed patent owner's claim for lost profits).
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of a reasonable royalty,' 48 the patentee's royalty will typically be
one-fourth to one-third of the profit earned by the infringer. 149
This may well exceed the patentee's expected contemporaneous
profits as a vendor of the patented goods. As between the two
measures, the statute commands that the reasonable royalty be
awarded, as it is the minimum level permitted. 150
B. New Perspective on Reasonable Royalty as a Device To Do Justice
Beginning with ChiefJudge Markey's Panduit decision in 1978 and
threading through to the Federal Circuit's decision in TWM Manu-
facturing Co. v. Dura Corp. 151 in 1986, the concept of reasonable roy-
alty and its sometimes underlying notion of "hypothetical
negotiation" 152 have been understood not as constituting attempted
reconstructions of actual-life negotiations in industrial settings.
Rather, these concepts have been regarded primarily as devices to
achieve justice in compensating patentees under 35 U.S.C. § 284.153
148. See infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text (explaining that profit sharing ap-
proach is now fully permissible under established case law).
149. See R.B. Young, An Industry Perspective of Licensing, in THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LI-
CENSING: LICENSING IN THE 1990's 323, 332 (Paul Bell &Jay Simon eds., 1991) (suggesting
that when royalty is based on anticipated profit of licensee, 25-357o of such profit is typical
agreed royalty); see also Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Paragon Optical, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA)
1001, 1027 (D. Ariz. 1987) (reporting testimony of Dudley Smith, royalty and patent licensing
expert). Smith took the view that as a starting point, with nothing else known about a particu-
lar patent other than its existence and the amount of profit expected to be earned by sale or
use of the invention covered thereby, one-quarter to one-third of the anticipated profit would
be agreed to be a reasonable royalty. Syntex, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. Smith further
stated that to proceed forward from that starting point, one should analyze the pertinent
Georgia-Pacific factors. Ida; see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1123-32, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 240-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (indicating that Geor-
gia-Pacific factors for setting reasonable royalty include: (1) patent owner's policy to maintain
and actual maintenance of monopoly in absence of infringement; (2) profitability of patented
product; (3) potential for increased profitability of patented product; (4) patent owner's prof-
its from collateral or convoyed sales; (5) substantial profits that infringer could reasonably
expect to earn from production of infringed product; and (6) profits that infringer could rea-
sonably expect to earn on collateral or convoyed sales), modified, 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 284; see also Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d
1568, 1578 n.18, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606, 1616 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that reason-
able royalty can exceed infringer's profit when district court determines that royalty is reason-
able under 35 U.S.C. § 284); Smith Int'l v. Hughes Tool Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 93-100
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (awarding reasonable royalty that exceeded lost profits based on precedent
of Panduit and authority of 35 U.S.C. § 284); Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578,
1583, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977,981 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[A] reasonable royalty ... is merely the
floor below which damages shall not fall.").
151. 789 F.2d 895, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
152. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining hypothetical negotiation meth-
odology, which determines damage award based on presumed theoretical royalty agreement
between patent owner and infringer prior to actual infringement).
153. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 731-32 (6th Cir. 1978). As stated by Chief Judge Markey (sitting by
designation):
Determination of a "reasonable royalty" after infringement, like many devices in the
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In Panduit, ChiefJudge Markey clearly indicated that justice requires
an infringer to pay more than whatever level of royalty would actu-
ally have been negotiated within the industry at the time infringe-
ment began. 154 How much more is, of course, difficult to quantify.
Unfortunately, district court judges are called on to determine the
appropriate royalty in each case, but they have virtually no legal
principles on which to base their decisions.15 5 With the help of the
Panduit test, however, courts began to recognize that industry-ac-
cepted license terms were generally inadequate to provide just com-
pensation to a patentee after litigation. 156
Other cases have stated the theme that "hypothetical negotiation"
is really just a device to do justice. 15 7 In line with this theme, the
law, rests on a legal fiction. Created in an effort to "compensate" when profits are
not provable, the "reasonable royalty" device conjures a "willing" licensor and licen-
see, who like the Ghosts of Christmas Past, are dimly seen as "negotiating" a "li-
cense." There is, of course, no actual willingness on either side, and no license to do
anything, the infringer being normally enjoined ... from further manufacture, use,
or sale of the patented product.
Id. at 1159, 197 U.S.P.. (BNA) at 732. Judge Markey also pointed out in Panduit the injustice
of treating a reasonable royalty as equal to what would have actually been negotiated in the
pertinent industry:
The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated, as it was
here, as the equivalent of ordinary royalty negotiations among truly "willing" patent
owners and licensees. That view would constitute a pretense that the infringement
never happened. It would also make an election to infringe a handy means for com-
petitors to impose a "compulsory license" upon every patent owner.
Except for the limited risk that the patent owner, over years of litigation, might
meet the heavy burden of proving the four elements required for recovery of lost
profits, the infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he [or she]
could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have
paid. As said by this court in another context, the infringer would be in a "heads-I-
win, tails-you-lose" position.
Id. at 1158, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 731 (citations omitted).
154. See Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1158, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 731 (stating that failure to as-
sign reasonable royalty greater than "negotiated" royalty would create pretense that infringe-
ment did not occur).
155. See, e.g., Serpentix Conveyor Corp. v. Roth, 726 F. Supp. 282, 284, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1074, 1075 (D. Colo. 1989) (stating that determination of damage award is based on
particular facts of each case); McDermott v. Omid Int'l, 723 F. Supp. 1228, 1235, 13
U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) 1147, 1152 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (asserting that increase in amount of dam-
ages and weighing of factors used to determine increase is left to court's discretion); see also
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(leaving determination as to amount of increase over industry norm to "sound discretion" of
trial court).
156. See, e.g., Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431,433 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming reasonable royalty award of 10%, despite
projected industry standard of 6%); Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d
604, 615-17, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 664 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming 33% royalty in case where
industry standard ranged from 3% to 10%), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984); Polaroid Corp.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1535 (D. Mass. 1990) (setting reasonable
royalty award that exceeded industry standard by more than 50%o).
157. See infra notes 159-71 and accompanying text (documenting cases where hypothetical
negotiation has been used to calculate damage awards that substantially exceed typical royalty
agreements negotiated prior to infringement).
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Federal Circuit has frequently taken the opportunity to reaffirm
Panduit's holding that an adjudicated infringer must pay more than
the industry norm in patent damages. 158 The court has given great
force to its concept of using hypothetical negotiation not as a mirror
of industry standards, but as a device to aid the cause ofjustice. In
what is now a long line of cases, the Federal Circuit has affirmed
awards substantially higher than would have been negotiated under
industry norms. For example, in Radio Steel & Manufacturing Co. v.
MTD Products, Inc.,15 9 the court affirmed an award of a 10% reason-
able royalty despite evidence establishing that the infringer in fact
expected a net profit of only 6%.160 And in Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.
v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 161 the court affirmed a 33% royalty despite
an industry standard royalty of only 3-107o. 162
In terms of raw dollars involved, Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. 16 is perhaps the most important decision on this point. In set-
ting a reasonable royalty for those Kodak sales for which Polaroid
was unable to prove a lost profits causal link, the court correctly
awarded a reasonable royalty. 164 That royalty was set at 10%,165
which amounted to "slightly more than sixty percent of Kodak's an-
158. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899-900, 229 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
525, 527-28 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming special master's royalty award of 30%o where industry stan-
dard net profit ranged from 6.56% to 12.5%o), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). In this impor-
tant decision, the court reasserted Panduit's language:
That [the patentee] might have agreed to a lesser royalty is of little relevance, for to
look only at that question would be to pretend that the infringement never hap-
pened. "It would also make an election to infringe a handy means for competitors to
impose a 'compulsory license' policy upon every patent owner." The willing licen-
see/licensor approach must be flexibly applied as "a device in the aid ofjustice."
Id at 900, 229 U.S.P.O. (BNA) at 528 (quoting Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1158, 197 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
at 731).
159. 788 F.2d 1554, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
160. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557, 229 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 431, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
161. 739 F.2d 604, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 654 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038
(1984).
162. Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 615-17, 222 U.S.P.OQ
(BNA) 654, 664 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984).
163. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass. 1990).
164. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1525-41 (D.
Mass. 1990). It is now well settled that such splitting of the damages into lost profits, where
proved, and reasonable royalty as to the remainder, is entirely proper. See, e.g., State Indus.,
Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("[T]he award may be split between lost profits as actual damages to the extent they are
proven and a reasonable royalty for the remainder."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990);
Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 826-27, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (approving damage award calculation based on lost profits on domestic sales and
reasonable royalty on foreign sales); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 527 (Fed. Cir.) (noting special master's calculation based on fixed roy-
alty and proven lost profits), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
165. Polaroid, 16 U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) at 1535.
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ticipated profits."'166 This figure was selected even though prior
licenses between the parties bore royalties no higher than 2.5%,
with the average being 1.7%, and Polaroid's average license rate to
others was only 4.9%.167
Judge Mazzone loosely explained the more-than-doubling ap-
proach undertaken in Polaroid as a fair composite based on the ana-
lytical approach 168 and the hypothetical negotiation approach to
reasonable royalty. 169 Viewed in this way, the outcome seems
hardly more than a seat-of-the-pants determination, resulting in
"reasonable" royalties for Kodak of some $207 million before inter-
est.170 Interest payments more than doubled the award figure.
171
This "reasonable royalty" award is perhaps more rationally viewed
as a largely discretionary decision that was based on the so-called
"extra" royalty imposed by the Panduit decision on infringers after
trial. 172 Unfortunately, this quasi-punitive aspect of Panduit has not
been further developed in the law, thus leaving district judges with
essentially no guidance on the critical problem posed by Panduit:
how much more should infringers be made to pay afterjudgment, as
compared to a supposed royalty agreement made in the absence of
an actual infringement?
These developments caused Professor Donald Chisum to remark:
Courts give weight to the licensing customs in the industry and
actual licenses on comparable patents in determining both the
royalty rate and the base for the reasonable royalty .... However,
this factor is rarely given decisive or even substantial effect due to the gener-
ally unique character of patented inventions and of the circumstances under
which they are developed and exploited.17
3
The real reason for the low significance given to industry custom is
probably not the unique-circumstances rationale advanced by Pro-
fessor Chisum.174 Rather, the cases reveal a practical concept of
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1534-35.
168. See infra notes 200-206 and accompanying text (explaining theory and application of
analytical approach).
169. Polaroid, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535 (discussing both analytical and hypothetical
negotiation approaches and concluding that such heterogeneous analysis will result in fair
compensation of patent owners).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1541.
172. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1978) (explaining that setting of reasonable royalty after
infringement cannot be treated as equivalent of ordinary royalty negotiations, lest compulsory
license ensue).
173. 5 CHisum, supra note 2, § 20.03[3] (emphasis added).
174. 5 CHStiM, supra note 2, § 20.03[3] (noting unique character of patented inventions
and their development).
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compensation for wrongdoing and a sensed need to discourage in-
fringement, as opposed to the limited or even nonexistent public
policy value of tracking industry licensing practices that emerged in
an environment of significant uncertainty about validity and
infringement.
C. Driven by the Desire To Achieve Just Compensation, the "Hypothetical
Negotiation" Is Overlaid with Artificial Premises
The list of justice-oriented premises that courts have now artifi-
cially encrusted upon the concept of hypothetical negotiation causes
one to wonder whether the concept has outlived its usefulness.
Consider the following artificial suppositions that are now imposed,
for policy reasons, on what used to be viewed as an actual industry
license negotiation:
* The patent is irrebuttably known to be valid at the time infringe-
ment commences.1 75 In reality, there is always substantial doubt
about patent validity, particularly at a prelitigation licensing
juncture, because not all of the prior art is known. '7 6 Even if the
prior art is known, the courts' thinking about the art is not
known.
* Infringement is irrebuttably known. 1 "7 In real life, this supposi-
tion is rarely true. With the vagaries of claim interpretation,
175. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1570,
9 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1273, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing trial court's recognition that in
hypothetical negotiations, unquestionably valid patent is presumed); Trio Process Corp. v. L.
Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d 126, 129, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 564 (3d Cir. 1976) (de-
claring that in hypothetical negotiation, both parties are assumed to agree that patent is valid
and would be respected by hypothetical licensee); General Motors Corp. v. Blackmore, 53
F.2d 725, 729 (6th Cir. 1931) (stating that reasonable royalty is premised on hypothetical
assumption that patent was valid and would be respected).
176. See Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Johnson &Johnson & Personal Prods. Co., 745 F.2d 1437,
1453, 223 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 603, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he real meaning of 'prior art' in
legal theory... is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at a
given time, to a person of ordinary skill in an art."); see also 2 CHIsuM, supra note 2, § 5.0411]
(noting that in most cases, "perfect knowledge" of prior art is unattainable).
177. See, e.g., Wallace Business Forms, Inc. v. Uarco Inc., No. 80-C-3397, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11191, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1988) (noting that hypothetical negotiations must
acknowledge that infringement has occurred); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 5 Cl.
Ct. 591, 607, 223 U.S.P.O. (BNA) 1308, 1317 (1984) (indicating that attempted settlements
and negotiations between parties concerning infringement could not have occurred during
hypothetical negotiations). The reasoning of these cases appears to follow closely the court's
thinking in Panduit, wherein ChiefJudge Markey remarked: "The setting of a reasonable roy-
alty after infringement cannot be treated, as it was here, as the equivalent of ordinary royalty
negotiations among truly 'willing' patent owners and licensees. That view would constitute a
pretense that the infringement never happened." Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc.,
575 F.2d 1152, 1158, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). The
court thus was setting forth the philosophy that in hypothetical negotiations fbr setting a rea-
sonable royalty, the trial court must take account of the now-known fact of infringement, and
attribute that mentality to the supposed "negotiating" parties. Id.
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prosecution history estoppel, and so on, infringement is seldom
"known" short of trial and appeal, except in cases in which it is
stipulated.
" The patentee is willing to issue a license.' 78 Again, in real life,
the patentee is frequently not willing to do this. In fact, Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.,179 the leading case ex-
plicating the willing-licensor/willing-licensee rule, indicates that
one of the factors to be considered in setting a reasonable roy-
alty is whether or not the patentee had an established policy of
refusing to license his or her patent.'80 A patentee's docu-
mented unwillingness leads to a higher reasonable royalty than
would have been awarded had the patentee been freely willing to
license the patent, presumably by an amount sufficient to render
him or her willing to grant the license.' 8 '
" The licensee is irrebuttably presumed to be willing to take a Ii-
178. See, e.g., Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335, 40 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 394, 403 (6th Cir. 1938) ("In fixing damages ... against an infringer, the sum allowed
should be reasonable and that which would be accepted by a prudent licensee who wished to
obtain a license but was not so compelled and a prudent patentee, who wished to grant a
license but was not so compelled."), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 581 (1939). Several pre-Panduit
cases have followed the Horvath rule. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121-22, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding
willing buyer/willing seller rule set forth in Horvath applicable to case at bar), modified, 446
F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 669, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 3, 17 (7th Cir.
1960) (citing Horvath's willing buyer/willing seller rule with approval), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
812 (1961).
179. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295,
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
180. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120,
166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (recognizing that licensor's effort to pre-
serve patent monopoly by refusing to grant licenses or by granting licenses under special
conditions is relevant to determination of reasonable royalty), modified, 446 F.2d 295, 170
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
181. Some cases can be read to suggest that real-life willingness or unwillingness on the
part of either party should have no role in reasonable royalty determinations pursuant to the
hypothetical negotiation approach. In Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075,
1081, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679,684 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court, responding to an argument by
the defendant that he would not have agreed to a royalty so high as that imposed by the
district court, pointed out that the actual unwillingness of a prospective real-life licensee is not
controlling. Id In Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
385, 391-92 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978), the court noted that the willing
buyer/willing seller concept "does not depend on the actual willingness of the parties to the
lawsuit to engage in such negotiations." Id. The court in Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1159, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 732, pointedly remarked that "[t]here is, of course, no actual willingness
on either side." ld
A better interpretation of these cases is that the unwillingness of one party or the other to
agree to certain terms in actual negotiations does not prevent those same terms from being
held as a "reasonable royalty" for infringement damages purposes. See Panduit, 575 F.2d at
1158-59, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 731-32 (ruling that infringer simply has to pay more than
ordinarily negotiated rate).
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cense.182 As all litigating lawyers know, many defendants are un-
willing to take a license at any price other than nuisance value or
some fraction of probable litigation costs.
' All relevant business facts are deemed known to both parties.18 3
As people experienced in patent licensing are aware, this suppo-
sition is virtually never the case. Prospective licensees tend to
carefully guard against revealing their concept of the actual value
of a license, lest they suffer in the negotiations because of mak-
ing such a revelation.
One of the most interesting extensions of this last artificial aspect
of hypothetical negotiation is the continuing trend of courts to allow
hypothetical negotiators to see into the future. The permissibility of
having a crystal ball at the bargaining table dates back to the
Supreme Court's 1933 decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petro-
leum Process Co. 184 Justice Cardozo's elegantly written opinion, while
182. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 828, 11 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (calculating damage award based on hypothesized negotiation
between willing licensee and licensor); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d
1573, 1576, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (assuming licensee would have
paid for license, despite licensee's failure to offer evidence of what it would have paid in actual
negotiated agreement), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789
F.2d 895, 898, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 526 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that both licensor and licen-
see agreed to calculation of damage award based on hypothetical negotiation), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1534 (D.
Mass. 1990) (finding that history of cooperation and sharing of resources between licensor
and licensee indicates willingness to enter into agreement).
183. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1122, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 210 (quoting in-
fringer's counsel's statement that hypothetical negotiation contemplates "marshaling of all of
the pertinent facts which, like cards dealt face up, are for all to see"); see also Datascope Corp.
v. SMEC, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 457, 463, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1963, 1968 (D.NJ. 1988) (noting
that court must assume both parties were privy to all pertinent information), aff'd in relevant
part, 879 F.2d 820, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1971, 1980 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (quoting Datascope policy of party
privity), aff'd in relevant part, 883 F.2d 1573, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 99
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (asserting that court must assume parties are mutually informed of all rele-
vant facts).
184. 289 U.S. 689 (1933). Justice Cardozo wrote:
An imaginary bid by an imaginary buyer, acting upon the information available at the
moment of the breach, is not the limit of recovery where the subject of the bargain is
an undeveloped patent. Information at such a time might be so scanty and imperfect
that the offer would be nominal. The promisee of the patent has less than fair com-
pensation if the criterion of value is the price that he would have received if he had
disposed of it at once, irrespective of the value that would have been uncovered if he
had kept it as his own .... But a different situation is presented if years have gone by
before the evidence is offered. Experience is then available to correct uncertain
prophecy. Here is a book of wisdom that courts may not neglect. We find no rule of
law that sets a clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to look within .... To correct
uncertain prophecies in such circumstances is not to charge the offender with ele-
ments of value non-existent at the time of his offense. It is to bring out and expose
to light the elements of value that were there from the beginning.
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698-99 (1933).
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highlighting the need for justice to be done, serves as a reminder of
just how far the hypothetical negotiation analysis was removed from
the reality of patent licensing, even at that early date. In the most
cited of all hypothetical negotiation cases, Georgia-Pacific, the district
court, while not alluding to the crystal ball thesis of Sinclair,'8 5 nev-
ertheless used the infringer's actual profits as a sort of check, to
make sure that the hypothetically negotiated royalty rate was in the
correct range.18 6 On appeal, the Second Circuit did likewise, taking
the actual profits as the base from which to modify the district
court's award slightly.18 7
The Federal Circuit enunciated its accord with Sinclair's crystal
ball methodology in its 1984 decision in Trans-World Manufacturing
Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc. ,18 where the court found error in ex-
cluding evidence of a patent infringer's actual profits. 8 9 And the
court expanded on the value of looking into the future in setting a
reasonable royalty after infringement in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate
& Supply Co. 190 In Fromson, the court explained the methodology of
hypothetical negotiation analysis.' 9' The court then remanded the
damages issue to the district court, noting that within its discretion,
185. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1123-
43, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 240-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (failing to mention Sinclair's forward-
looking approach to patent damages), modified, 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
186. Id. at 1123, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 240. Georgia-Pacfic was, however, not the first
famous case on either reasonable royalty or the hypothetical negotiation methodology for
setting such a royalty. The general concept of reasonable-royalty recovery dates back at least
to United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610 (6th Cir. 1914). The court in that case
determined that a patentee who was unable to prove lost profits should not be relegated to
injunctive relief alone, but that damages should be awarded based on "what plaintiff's patent
property was, to what extent defendant has taken it, its usefulness and commercial value as
shown by its advantages over other things and by the extent of its use." Id. at 617; see also
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (permitting pat-
entee who was unable to show lost profits or established royalty to "show the value by proving
what would have been a reasonable royalty, considering the nature of the invention, its utility
and advantages, and the extent of the use involved").
187. Georgia-Pacific, 446 F.2d at 299-300, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 371-74.
188. 750 F.2d 1552, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
189. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1556-58, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 268-70 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (disagreeing with district court's exclusion as
evidence of infringer's profits from sale of eyeglasses for use in determining reasonable
royalty).
190. 853 F.2d 1568, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
191. See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1988). According to the court:
[The hypothetical negotiation analysis] encompasses fantasy and flexibility; fantasy
because it requires a court to imagine what warring parties would have agreed to as
willing negotiators; flexibility because it speaks of negotiations as of the time in-
fringement began, yet permits and often requires a court to look to events and facts
that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to or predicted by the
hypothesized negotiators.
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the district court might set the reasonable royalty as a percentage of
the infringer's actual profits.'
92
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has steadfastly refused to allow
defendants the same privilege of the crystal ball in order to reduce
their liability for reasonable royalties. In Radio Steel & Manufacturing
Co. v. MTD Products, Inc. ,193 Weinar v. Rollform, Inc.,1 94 and Hanson v.
Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 195 the defendant-infringers urged the
court to weigh their actual profits more heavily than previous juris-
prudence allowed.1 96 They complained that the reasonable royal-
ties assessed against them should be reduced because their actual
profits were less than anticipated. 197 In all three cases, however, the
Federal Circuit rejected that argument.1 98
In view of the increasing number of assumptions engrafted onto
the underlying fiction of hypothetical negotiation, the Federal Cir-
cuit should consider whether the time has come to abolish the fic-
tion altogether and to relegate it, as Georgia-Pacific did, to being just
one of the factors considered by a court in calculating a reasonable
royalty. 199 The engrafted "assumptions" of validity, infringement,
192. See id. at 1578, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615-16 (holding that district court has wide
discretion to determine fair royalty, including liberty to consider infringer's actual profits, as it
deems appropriate).
193. 788 F.2d 1554, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
194. 744 F.2d 797, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985).
195. 718 F.2d 1075, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
196. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557, 229 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 431, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Weinar v. Rollform, Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 807, 223 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 369, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Hanson v. Alpine Valley
Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
197. Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 1557, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 433; Weinar, 744 F.2d at 807,
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 375; Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1081, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 684.
198. See Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 1557, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 433 (noting that reasonable
royalty is not based on infringer's actual profit); Weinar, 744 F.2d at 807, 223 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
at 375 (concluding that infringer's failure to realize profit is irrelevant to reasonable royalty
calculation); Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1081, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 684 (clarifying that infringer's
profit factor is not calculated based on hindsight evaluation of what actually occurred). But see
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d 1403, 1407-
08, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1871, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting patentee's damages ap-
peal and criticizing plaintiff's expert witness for, inter alia, being ignorant of actual profit
levels involved after date of hypothetical negotiation). The Federal Circuit rejected the wit-
ness' statement that courts do not consider actual later profits in hypothetical negotiations as
being contrary to Trans-World Manufacturing, id. at 1407-08, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75,
in which the court stated that the infringer's actual profits are considered in calculating the
reasonable royalty. Trans-World Mfg. Co. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568,
224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 269 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This result may suggest the court's willing-
ness to allow glimpses into the future on a two-way basis.
199. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1123-
43, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 240-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (basing reasonable royalty calculation
on consideration of numerous factors including actual and expected profits, profits generated
by collateral sales, existing licenses comparable to infringement dispute, and unique nature
and facts of infringement), modified, 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
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and business information would be better viewed as reminders to
the decisionmaker on reasonable royalty to help him or her reach a
just result, rather than as facts artificially deemed "known" at an
artificial negotiation. Accordingly, the court should examine the
business realities at the time infringement began and subsequently,
independent of any theory that a hypothetical negotiation has oc-
curred. Validity and infringement having been truly determined in
the trial, and the legal doctrine having been noted that the defend-
ant has to pay more than the usually negotiated rate, these factors
need not be considered "irrebuttable assumptions" in an unreal li-
cense negotiation. They stand on their own as factors affecting the
real decision on a just royalty.
Finally, the fictitious assumptions of willingness to grant and take
a license should no longer be indulged. Rather, the degree of will-
ingness or unwillingness of a patentee should be weighed in deter-
mining what royalty rate is fair and just. In other words, if a
patentee had a policy of not licensing his or her patent, that factor
would tend to increase an award. This increase would not occur
because of any fictional assumptions, but because the patentee had
actually been harmed to a greater degree than some other patentee
who, for other reasons, was in fact willing to license his or her
patent.
D. Rise of the Analytical Approach
Cases applying the so-called "analytical approach" provide exam-
ples of how things might work if the hypothetical negotiation doc-
trine were jettisoned from Federal Circuit jurisprudence. A vestige
of hypothetical negotiation remains under the analytical approach
where an infringer's anticipated net profit margin is adopted as the
starting point for the measurement of patent damages. From this
figure, some "standard" or "acceptable" level of profit is subtracted
and left to the infringer; the remaining portion of the anticipated
profit is awarded to the patentee as a reasonable royalty.200 The
methodology thus shifts from the fiction of hypothesizing what
would have been negotiated in an imaginary licensing environment
to the reality of determining what should be paid as fair compensa-
• 200. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898-902, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
525, 526-29 (Fed. Cir.) (explaining special master's application of analytical approach), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349-53, 193
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385, 391-94 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (applying Georgia-Pacific formula and allocating
normal profit to infringer and remainder of gross profit to patent owner); Georgia-Pacific, 446
F.2d at 296-300, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 370-73 (explaining application of analytical
approach).
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tion for patent infringement. Thus far, three appellate cases have
applied this approach: Georgia-Paific,201 Tektronix, Inc. v. United
States,20 2 and TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp. 203
One problem with the analytical approach is that it is presently
unclear just when the method can be applied. The Federal Circuit
has consistently stated that there is no one correct way to arrive at a
reasonable royalty in a given case and has noted that district courts
have wide discretion to choose any methodology they wish. 20 4 The
problem is that different methodologies can lead to widely varying
results20 5 and district courts are given little guidance on which
methodology to select. They are apparently to rely on the "feel" of
a given case as it is tried before them.
One of the fears defendants have of the analytical approach is that
it usually leads to a much higher royalty than other approaches
would yield. 206 A possible cure for that problem, in accordance with
the above proposal to abolish the fiction of hypothetical negotiation,
would be to eliminate the need to set the royalty as of the time in-
fringement began. This timing concept seems to arise out of a sup-
posed need to conduct a hypothetical negotiation. With the
recommended abolition of the hypothetical negotiation, there will
no longer be any need to fix a royalty at the time infringement be-
201. 446 F.2d 295, 296-300, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369, 370-73 (2d Cir.) (deriving in-
fringer's anticipated profit from sales of similar products, subtracting net-profit level of de-
fendant corporation in recent years, and awarding differences as reasonable royalty), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
202. 552 F.2d 343, 349-53, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385, 391-94 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (calculating
damage award by determining infringer's net profit and assigning net profit to patentee as
imaginary royalty).
203. 789 F.2d 895, 898-902, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 526-29 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming spe-
cial master's award of 30% royalty based on analytical approach subtracting infringer's usual
net profit from its anticipated net profit), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
204. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (citing Federal Circuit cases that recognize
wide discretion of district court to determine damage awards).
205. For example, consider a hypothetical fact pattern: manufacturing cost savings
achieved by defendant through use of the invention are $1 per unit. Profits earned by that
defendant by use of the invention, versus whatever she used before, are $11 per unit. A
reasonable royalty based on the cost savings would be some fraction of $1 per unit, or else the
licensee would have no reason to enter the license agreement. By contrast, a reasonable roy-
alty based on sharing the added profit would typically be around $3 per unit. See supra note
149 (noting views of R.B. Young and Dudley Smith that reasonable royalty based on profit is
normally centered near 30% of profits).
206. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 527
(Fed. Cir.) (dismissing infringer's argument that inappropriate application of analytical ap-
proach yielded "exorbitant" royalty, where infringer failed to demonstrate that application of
analytical approach was unreasonable), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); Tektronix, Inc. v.
United States, 552 F.2d 343, 348, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385, 390-91 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (rejecting
infringer's sliding scale approach to calculating reasonable royalty that would have imposed
lesser penalty upon infringer). But see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Pa-
pers Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 302, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369, 373-74 (2d Cir.) (reducing trial court's
damage award that precluded infringer from realizing reasonable profit), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
870 (1971).
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gan. Realistically, there is no reason to do so. Defendants ought to
enjoy the benefits of future events when their profit margins turn
sour, rather than only allowing consideration of future profits at the
behest of patentees, as in present law. The analytical approach, as
thus modified, would be a far better determinant ofjust compensa-
tion than is provided by the present hyperfiction of the hypothetical
negotiation.
E. Some Unresolved Issues Concerning Reasonable Royalty
Notwithstanding the extensive development of patent damages by
the Federal Circuit over the last eight years, several very important
questions have yet to be addressed. Foremost among these is the
selection of a reasonable royalty approach in a jury trial. The Fed-
eral Circuit has pointed out that there is no single or mandatory way
to assess a reasonable royalty20 7 and has consistently left the choice
of approach to the sound discretion of the district courts. 20 8 In each
of these cases, however, the district court was sitting as trier of fact
as well as enunciator of law. 2
0 9
Presently, the allocation of decisional responsibilities between
judge and jury in patent cases is extremely awkward. It seems likely
that in order to preserve the right to a trial by jury on damages, the
selection of an approach to reasonable royalty calculation must be
left to the jury. But how should a judge instruct a jury regarding
that calculation? At present, the best that judges can do is readju-
207. See, e.g., TWM, 789 F.2d at 899, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527 (observing that 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 does not mandate how district court must compute reasonable royalty, only that figure
must compensate for infringement).
208. See, e.g., TWM, 789 F.2d at 898,229 U.S.P.O. (BNA) at 526 (noting that methodology
of assessing and computing damages is within discretion of district court); Yarway Corp. v.
Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 275, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 357 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(indicating that district court has considerable discretion in determining damage awards);
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 409 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (limiting district court's discretion to award damages that adequately compensate
for infringement and are at least equivalent in magnitude to reasonable royalty), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986). On this point, the standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1581, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 357, 363 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that infringer bears burden of proving that
district court abused its discretion in determining damages); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v.
Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 21, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591, 598 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (limit-
ing appellate review of damage award to circumstances where trial court abused discretion in
selecting method of calculating award).
209. See TWM, 789 F.2d at 898, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 526 (pointing out that damages
were tried to special master reporting to district court); Yarway, 775 F.2d at 272, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 353 (issuingjudgment on findings of fact by district court); King Instrument, 767 F.2d
at 855, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 402 (rendering judgment "following a bench trial"); Seattle Box,
756 F.2d at 1578, 1581, 225 U.S.P.O. (BNA) at 358-59 (noting that decision on remand was
by district court findings); Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 14, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 593 (review-
ing accounting for damages held by district court).
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rors the list of Georgia-Pacific factors, 210 tell them to consider which-
ever ones they deem appropriate in light of the credible evidence,
and inform them that they can also consider any other factors that
they feel should justifiably go into the determination of a reasonable
royalty. There are no current guidelines that indicate how to assess
the Georgia-Pacific factors, whether or not to apply the analytical ap-
proach, or how much future events should influence the so-called
hypothetical negotiation. In addition, lawyers are perplexed regard-
ing the extent to which their expert witnesses on damages should be
allowed to cite prior reported court cases as bases for their opin-
ions. In the writer's experience, district judges are reluctant to al-
low testimony on what they regard as either law or results reached
in other cases. To indulge that reluctance, however, would exclude
the entire history of prior reasonable royalty determinations while
continuing to admit evidence of prior actual licenses, which, under
Panduit, are an insufficient measure of reasonable royalty. 21' Jurors
undoubtedly find these restrictions highly perplexing.
V. THE PROBLEM OF DEDUCTION FOR WOULD-HAvE-BEEN
INCOME TAXEs
One of the least understood and most recurrent problems in pat-
ent damages involves the question of how, if at all, to account for
income taxes that would have accrued against the plaintiff on the
lost profits now awarded to him or her as damages for past years of
infringement. The fact that a damages award is taxable in the year
paid does not really address the problem, for two reasons. First,
interest is normally awarded for a period running from each of the
infringing years to the date of judgment and will lead to a higher
award if tax calculation is deferred to the year ofjudgment than if an
estimated tax is subtracted each year in the damage calculation
before accural of interest. 212 Second, income tax rates are lower
now than in most prior years.213
In cases where the infringement began many years back-ten to
210. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing Georgia-Pacfic factors).
211. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding that failure to award reasonable royalty
greater than "negotiated" royalty would create pretense that infringement did not occur).
212. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing calculation of taxes on lost
profits, taking note of lengthy periods of infringement and subsequent effect of greatly in-
creasing damages awards).
213. Compare I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981) (listing maximum personal income
tax rate of 70% on excess over $108,300 and maximum corporate rate of 46% on excess over
$100,000) with I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1988) (listing maximum personal rate of 38.5% on excess over
$54,000 and maximum corporate rate of 34% on excess over $75,000).
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fifteen years is not uncommon in complex patent cases2 14-the ef-
fect of tax-deferred compounding can easily double the size of the
judgment.215 If the judgment is then to be taxed at today's rela-
tively low rates, a substantial extra benefit accrues to the patentee.
This result is not grounded in logic or reason. Courts nevertheless
generally refuse to allow any deduction for taxes in damage calcula-
tions.216 The reasons for this refusal are misplaced.
Courts' reluctance is stated to be based on the Supreme Court's
1968 decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.217
In Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court reviewed a court of appeals de-
cision to remand an antitrust case to the district court for the deduc-
tion of taxes from a damages award to a corporate plaintiff.21 8
Noting the policy of the Internal Revenue Service to tax damage
awards of this type in the year received, the Court upheld the dis-
trict court's computation, thereby shielding the plaintiff from the
supposed dilemma of double taxation.21 9 Courts have generally fol-
lowed the Hanover Shoe rule in patent cases 220 and have even ex-
tended the rule to apply to "would-have-been" foreign income
214. See, e.g., Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1140, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1828, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting passage of 10 years); Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d
1473, 1476, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting passage of 14 years
between first infringing year and court's damages ruling); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1173, 14 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1020, 1022 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (noting that 16 years passed from first recoverable year to Federal Circuit ruling on
damages).
215. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 503 (1968) (deter-
mining that decreasing plaintiff's damage award by amount of taxes it would have paid during
period of infringement would cause double deduction of taxes and leave plaintiff with less
income than if infringement had not occurred); see also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1541 (D. Mass. 1990) (indicating that damage award, subject to
both state and federal taxation, should not be based on after-tax royalty figures in order to
avoid double taxation).
216. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text (citing instances where courts have
refused to adjust damage awards to accommodate shifting tax rates).
217. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
218. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 502-03 (reviewing court of appeals finding that damages
suffered by plaintiff were limited to after-tax profits that it had failed to receive).
219. Id. at 503. The Court stated that:
[To diminish the actual damages by the amount of the taxes that it would have paid
had it received greater profits in the years it was damaged would be to apply a double
deduction for taxation, leaving [the plaintiff] with less income than it would have had
if [the defendant] had not injured it.
Id.
220. See, e.g., TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1017, 1020, 1025-26 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (following precedent of Hanover Shoe by refusing to
reduce damages award); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 761 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-36, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1014-15 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (refusing to reduce award despite fall in
corporate tax rate from 467o in 1985 to 34% in 1989-1990, and noting complication of fur-
ther reducing state income taxes that would otherwise be assessed); Polaroid Corp. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1541 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting that award based
on post-tax profits could leave patent owner subject to double taxation). No reported case to
the contrary has been identified.
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taxes.221
The so-called double taxation problem is illusory. The effect of
current taxation can be readily adjusted in the award by a procedure
known as "grossing up."22 2 Under this procedure, a damages award
is calculated with appropriate reductions for would-have-been fed-
eral and state corporate income taxes in the years in question, in-
cluding taxes on prejudgment interest accruing in those years. An
amount is then added to the award so that when current income
taxes are paid, the calculated award will remain intact, and no
double taxes will be imposed. This procedure corrects for the ef-
fects of lower current tax rates, and also for the taxability of accrued
prejudgment interest, on a year-by-year basis. The procedure may
have weaknesses in detail if extended too far, such as the difficulty of
judging whether the plaintiff would have been able to shelter some
of the income. Nevertheless, this point seems minor in comparison
to the overall fairness achievable by grossing up. As for the
mechanics of recalculating past years' taxes, today's age of comput-
erized tax returns usually makes the calculations quick and straight-
forward. Unfortunately, courts have not yet accepted the rationality
of grossing up, despite the advantages of the procedure. 225
VI. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ISSUES
Recent years have seen the solid establishment of the proposition
that successful patent-owner litigants are normally entitled to pre-
judgment interest as part of their damages awards. These years
have also borne witness to the problems encountered by district
courts in determining the exceptions to that general rule and in de-
ciding on a discretionary basis to select appropriate rates and com-
pounding terms.2 24
The basic proposition that prejudgment interest should be
221. See Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1482-83, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093,
1100 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that deduction of British corporate taxes from damages
award was improper).
222. This term was coined by counsel for Eastman Kodak Co. in the Polaroid damages
litigation to characterize the calculation described here.
223. See TP Orthodontics, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025-26 (refusing to reduce damage
award because tax laws changed between time of injury and time of recovery); Micro Motion,
761 F. Supp. at 1435-36, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014-15 (refusing to adjust damage award
to compensate for decrease in federal taxation rate during period of infringement); Polaroid,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (refusing to reduce year-by-year damage accruals for income
taxes and then gross-up damage award, because of uncertainty and possibility of under or
overcompensation, and determining interest rate after consideration of relevant factors, in-
cluding infringer's windfall argument).
224. See infra notes 228-49 and accompanying text (documenting instances of appellate
court review of district court methodologies in assessing prejudgment interest adjustments to
damage awards).
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awarded to successful patent litigants as a matter of course stems
directly from the Supreme Court's ruling in General Motors Corp. v.
Devex Corp.22 5 The Court held that "prejudgment interest should
ordinarily be awarded absent some justification for withholding such
an award." 22 6 The Federal Circuit has issued a line of decisions fol-
lowing this general rule, and it is now well settled law.227 The prob-
lem areas that have emerged within the general rule may be
grouped into two categories: (1) identifying the exceptions to the
Devex rule, that is, the cases in which no prejudgment interest will be
allowed; and (2) determining the applicable interest rates and com-
pounding terms. A review of appellate decisions over the last three
years shows the current state of the law on this subject.
In Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,228 the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's unexplained denial of prejudgment interest on
both patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation
awards. 229 The court treated the issue in short order, saying only
that it saw no "exceptional" circumstances under Devex to deny pre-
judgment interest on the patent claim, and that it could not see any
reason why prejudgment interest should be handled differently for
the trade secret claim. 2
30
Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Manufacturing Co. 2 3 1 involved a de-
fendant's argument and district court's ruling that interest should
be denied because the plaintiff was a mere licensor of the patent, not
225. 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
226. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983). The Court ex-
plained that this would compensate for "the foregone use of the money between the time of
infringement and the date ofjudgment." Id. at 656.
227. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1432, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (asserting district judge's discretion to determine prejudg-
ment interest rate); Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 898 F.2d 787, 791-92, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156, 1159-60 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (following Devex as general rule and finding
abuse of discretion by district court in failing to award prejudgment interest); Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1250, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1931 (Fed. Cir.) (conclud-
ing that "[p]rejudgment interest is the rule governing [patent infringement] award[s]"), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); cf Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 274, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1983, 1988-89 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding reason for withholding prejudg-
ment interest to be exception to rule); Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 807
F.2d 964, 967-70, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (determining proper
scope of prejudgment interest award), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
228. 868 F.2d 1226, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853
(1989).
229. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1250, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913,
1931 (Fed. Cir.) (finding no factual basis for withholding prejudgment interest award based
on distinction between misappropriated trade secret and patent infringement cases), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989). For the Federal Circuit's discussion of trade secret issues, see id. at
1242-46, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1925-27 (describing trade secret as information used in business
that provides opportunity to gain advantage over competitors).
230. Id. at 1250, 9 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1931.
231. 898 F.2d 787, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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a manufacturing entity, and because the plaintiff had agreed to a
three-year stay sought by the defendant. 23 2 In reversing the district
court's holding, the Federal Circuit relied on Devex's rationale of
placing successful plaintiffs in the position they would have occu-
pied absent the patent infringement.23 3 Allen Archery was a reason-
able royalty case and not a lost profits case, as was Devex, but the
court perceived no reason to treat royalty plaintiffs differently than
lost profits plaintiffs in the context of their being made whole for the
lost use of patent royalties.23 4 The court therefore excused the
three-year stay on the ground that the stay had been mainly sought
by the defendant. 235
In Kalman v. Berlyn Corp. ,236 an infringer argued that a six-year de-
lay by the plaintiff in bringing suit gave rise to an exception to De-
vex. 237 During the six-year period, however, the plaintiff was
engaged in litigation with another defendant, Kimberly-Clark, who
was a reseller of the infringer's product.2 38 In refusing to find a
Devex exception, the Federal Circuit relied on the infringer's knowl-
edge, control, and financing of the Kimberly-Clark litigation.23 9
Finally, the Federal Circuit found a partial Devex exception in Uni-
royal, Inc. v. Rudkin- Wiley Corp. 240 The district court denied prejudg-
ment interest for a four-year period during which the litigation had
been stayed upon the original request of the plaintiff and the agree-
ment of the defendant.24' The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding without mentioning or attempting to distinguish its
Allen Archery ruling.242 The cases are perhaps distinguishable, in that
232. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 898 F.2d 787, 791, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
233. See id. (holding patentee eligible for prejudgment interest despite fact that patentee's
business was limited to licensing its patent).
234. See id. ("It would be inconsistent with [the Devex] rationale to require... the district
court... to consider and determine what use the patentee would have made of the royalty
payments it should have received.").
235. Id. at 792, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
236. 914 F.2d 1473, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
237. Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485-86, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1093, 1102-
03 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
238. Id.
239. See id. (rejecting infringer's argument that patent owner caused undue delay in prose-
cution of lawsuit because infringer was fully aware of Kimberly-Clark litigation, and affirming
district court's award of prejudgment interest to patent owner, Dr. Kalman).
240. 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
241. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 721 F. Supp. 28, 28 n.1, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1192, 1202 n.1 (D. Conn. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q02d
(BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
242. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1546, 19 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1432, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (upholding district court decision to deny prejudgment interest
where patent owner caused delay in proceeding and noting that other unforeseen circum-
stances might warrant withholding such award).
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the stay in Allen Archery was originally sought by the defendant,
whereas in Uniroyal it was sought by the plaintiff.
Turning now to interest rates and terms of compounding, the re-
cent cases indicate appellate approval of an almost unfettered dis-
cretion in the district courts. No reported cases have reversed
district judges in their decisions on these points. In Uniroyal, the
Federal Circuit approved the district court's selection of the prime
rate as the appropriate rate of interest on the ground that the plain-
tiff had at least once borrowed at that rate, although the court noted
that such a borrowing history is not necessary to support a lower
court's choice of the prime rate.243 In Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc. ,244
the court approved an interest rate of 8.94% without detailed dis-
cussion, against a patentee's argument that the court should have
set a higher rate.245 In Allen Archery, the Federal Circuit found no
abuse of discretion in the district court's compounding of prejudg-
ment interest on a quarterly basis, against an argument that it
should not be compounded at all.246 Furthermore, in Datascope Corp.
v. SMEC, Inc. ,247 the court held that annual compounding of pre-
judgment interest by the district court did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.248 There was evidence that the defendant in Datascope
would, in a hypothetical negotiation, have attempted to set the roy-
alty payment period to be no more frequent than annually. 249 The
dearth of discussion on these points in the Federal Circuit opinions
probably indicates a judicial dissatisfaction with attempts by appel-
lants to upset district courts' exercise of their wide discretion in this
area.
243. Uniroyal, 939 F.2d at 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. The court noted the wide
latitude enjoyed by district courts in selecting interest rates, citing as an example Gyromat
Corp. v. Champion Spark Plugs Co., 735 F.2d 549, 556-57, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4, 8-10 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), and stated that the district court "may award interest at or above the prime rate."
Uniroyal, 939 F.2d at 1545, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (citing Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1066, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and Studiengesell-
schaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1579-80, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1273, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 1988), as support for proposition).
244. 926 F.2d 1136, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
245. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1144-45, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828,
1834 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
246. See Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 898 F.2d 787, 791, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1156, 1159-60 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.,
807 F.2d 964, 969, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) ("The rate of prejudg-
ment interest and whether it should be compounded or uncompounded are matters left
largely to the discretion of the district court."), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
247. 879 F.2d 820, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024
(1990).
248. Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 829, 11 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1321,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's decision to base prejudgment interest on
annual compounding method), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
249. ld
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CONCLUSION
The law governing recovery of damages for patent infringement
has undergone considerable development in the last decade. The
development has occurred notwithstanding the fact that the applica-
ble statutory provisions have not changed. The development has
proceeded along lines of increased rationality, although with results
usually favoring patent owners.
Major issues remain to be addressed and decided. Foremost
among these are: (1) how much "more" must an infringer pay for a
reasonable royalty than the amount that could have been negotiated
in real-life licensing, and how is this to be determined without turn-
ing the analysis into a punitive one? (2) as between judge and jury,
who chooses the "methodology" of reasonable royalty, especially as
between the analytical approach and the hypothetical negotiation
approach? (3) has the "hypothetical negotiation" approach become
so laden with artificial premises that its usefulness as a device to do
justice has been outlived? and (4) what other alternatives to the
Panduit analysis for lost profits recovery can be designed, beyond
those presently recognized in the case law? These and other dam-
ages issues await resolution in this rapidly unfolding area of intellec-
tual property law.
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